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Abstract
We present new data on real output per worker, schooling per worker, human capital per worker,
real physical capital per worker for 168 countries. The output data represent all available data from
Maddison. The physical capital data represent all available data from Mitchell. One major contribution
is a new set of human capital per worker, the foundation of which comes mostly from Mitchell. We
provide original estimates of schooling per worker & per young worker. We find strong support for
intergenerational accumulation of human capital with spillovers. With our preferred measure of human
capital, over 90 percent of the variation in long run growth can be explained by variation in the growth
of inputs per worker, and less than 10 percent from variation in TFP growth. Furthermore between
55% and 70% of the variation in log of output per worker can be explained by variation in the log input
levels, and less than half of the log level output per worker variation is explained by variation in log
TFP levels. These results are robust to different time periods, and different parameter values on the
human capital accumulation technology. We find positive correlation with micro based cross country
estimates of human capital, particularly those provided by Hendricks (2002) and Schoellman (2012).
1 Introduction
Since 1820, during the Industrial Revolution, the disparity in income per capita has increased dra-
matically. In 1820, the Netherlands, with highest output per worker ($5945), was 6.5 times richer than
North Korea, the country with the lowest output per worker ($911).1 In 2010, the top to bottom distance
is between the United States ($76,500) and Zaire ($834), or a factor of 90.2 The standard deviation of
the log of output per worker has increased from .42 in 1820 to 1.12 in 2010. The primary objectives of
this paper are to account for the factors that have resulted in the growth of output per worker, and to
∗We thank Peter Klenow, Chad Jones, Kevin M. Murphy, Richard Rogerson, Todd Schoellman, Curtis Simon, Paula Tkac,
Kei-Mu Yi for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank the seminar participants at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, 2009 NBER Time and Space Conference at the Philadelphia FRB, 2009 Midwest Macroeconomics Meetings at
Indiana University, Human Capital and Economic Development Conference at the Korean Labor Institute, Stanford University,
Osaka City University, Osaka University, ICU.
†Clemson University, Clemson University & Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Queens College of City University of New
York, Clemson University
1All values are expressed in 2000 PPP dollars. We acknowledge that some have expressed concern about the underlying
quality of Maddison data, see Barro and Ursu´a (2008). However we are not concerned with crises, nor short run cyclical
deviations, but rather, long run growth, so we believe that Maddison is the appropriate long run source. We believe this result
is robust as the ratio of the second highest output per worker country, United States ($5079), with the second lowest output
per worker country, Nepal ($986), is 5.2
2Luxembourg is the most productive country with output per worker of more than $137,000 in 2010, but we chose to go
with the second most productive country instead.
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explain the increase in dispersion of output per worker. To this end, we use data from Maddison (Bolt and
van Zanden (2013)), Mitchell (2003a,b,c), and Lindert (2004) to produce a data set that has per worker
measures of output, physical capital, and human capital, and covers 168 countries from the onset of the
Industrial Revolution for every region of the world.3 Over this long horizon, the growth in factors of pro-
duction account for between three fifths and 85 percent of output per worker growth. More striking, the
variation in the growth rates of inputs can account for at least one half, and as much as 95 percent of the
variation in the growth rates of output per worker. This is in marked contrast to previous work over shorter
time horizons that find that TFP growth variation is much more important than input growth variation
in explaining output per worker growth variation. For example Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997) find less
than 20% of output growth variation is explained by input growth variation. Baier, Dwyer and Tamura
(2006), hereafter BDT, have a longer time series, but still find that barely 20% of output per worker growth
variation is explained by input per worker growth variation.
In this paper we develop a new data set, which dramatically expands the data available in BDT. The
number of countries is expanded from 145 to 168, but more importantly, the length of coverage for all
countries is increased. Further we have the growth of formal schooling in every region from illiteracy to
universal primary schooling, near universal secondary schooling and rising attendance in higher education.4
Using a Bils-Klenow definition of human capital, we find that 46% of the variation in growth rates of
output per worker is captured by variations in growth rates of inputs. If one uses an intergenerational
human capital accumulation technology, over 90 percent of growth in output per worker can be explained
by the growth in real physical capital per worker and human capital per worker. Of log level differences,
development accounting, 44% are explained using the Bils-Klenow human capital definition, however with
intergenerational human capital accumulation anywhere from 55% to 70% of the variation are explained
by log level differences in inputs.
One important caveat to bear in mind. We take the time path of input accumulation, physical capital
and human capital as given. We think that high quality institutions matter a great deal in providing both
a higher return on existing inputs, more output per worker, as well as greater incentives to accumulate. If
inputs explain output per worker differences at a point in time, and differential growth rates of inputs explain
differential output per worker growth rates, then institutions can be primary. The list of contributors to this
line of research is large, but certainly includes: Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001,2002, 2005a,b),
Auer (2013), Canaday and Tamura (2009), Comin, Easterly & Gong (2010), Easterly & Levine (2003),
Engerman and Sokolof (2012), Gwartney and Lawson (2008), Keefer and Knack (1997a,b), Kormendi and
Meguire (1985), Maseland (2013), North (1981, 1990), Parente and Prescott (1994, 1999, 2002) and Tamura,
Simon and Murphy (2016).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we give a brief overview of the data used in the
paper. The interested reader can read our companion Data Appendix (2016) for more details on methods
and sources. Section 3 contains the growth accounting. Section 4 contains our variance decomposition of
growth. We use three different measures of input importance for capturing disparate economic performance.
3See our Data Appendix (2016) for more detail on other primary data sources, as well as methodology.
4After the penultimate version of this paper was written, we became aware of Lee & Lee (2016). Their paper produces
original estimates of years of schooling for 15-64 men and women, separately, from 1870-2010. They use many of the same
sources as we do, but do not convert enrollment rates for some countries in 1820 into years of schooling as we do here. We also
make use of Morrisson and Murtin (2009). They use many similar sources, but for 74 instead of 168 countries. Their series
covers 1870-2010, whereas ours covers about half a century earlier. However we are able to benchmark primary, secondary
and occasionally tertiary schooling enrollment rates prior to 1870 as their work provides estimates of the exposure share of
these three categories starting in 1870. For more details see our Data Appendix.
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We present intergenerational human capital in Section 5, with and without spillovers. Section 6 examines
the robustness of our conclusions. Evidence from micro data is presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Data
We use Maddison for data on real PPP per capita output.5 All values are in real 2000 dollars. We
use Mitchell (2003a,b,c) for historical data on labor force.6 From these base data we produce measures of
PPP real output per worker. For investment rates in physical capital we used both Mitchell (2003a,b,c) for
historical values as well as Summers, Heston and Aten (2009).7 To produce physical capital stock values,
we use a variety of methods. When other researchers have computed capital output ratios, we use their
estimates, for example Picketty and Zucman (2014) estimate capital output ratios for nine countries, three
of them back to 1700. We used their results for all of the observations on these countries. If we do not have
country specific estimates of investment rates, we were able to create sectoral output shares for all but 22
observations. From these measures of sectoral output shares, agriculture, industry and services, we applied
the US capital output ratio for agriculture, industry and services for the decade of country observation.
These sector specific ratios for the US cover every census year 1850 - 2000. We used the 1850 values for
years 1800-1840. Finally if we had investment rates, we used them with perpetual inventory methods, using
the aforementioned capital estimates as initial conditions for the first missing year. For example all values
for 2010 come using perpetual inventory calculations, with the exception of the nine countries provided by
Piketty and Zucman (2014). We use the standard perpetual inventory method to produce real physical
capital per worker.8
For human capital, we first produce original estimates of schooling for each country by age cohort as
well as the average schooling in the labor force.9 This is an original contribution to the literature as prior
5Data are from Bolt and van Zanden (2013) at: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/madison-project/home.htm. For some
countries missing 2010 values, we used the growth rate of PPP output per capita from 2008 to 2010 from World Development
Report 2011 and 2012 to produce our 2010 value.
6See our Data Appendix (2016) for greater detail. For 2010 labor force we used the World Development Indicators. For
historical labor force earlier than what Mitchell provides, we found additional secondary sources. However for many countries
we used a procedure in which we use the urban-rural population shares. We have information on all but 3 countries back to
their initial year of observation. We are able to find 15-64 labor force to population ratios in the urban population and the
rural population to fit the labor force data that we observe. We then use these to apply in the earlier years, either the average
values or the closest set of early observations.
7We used overlapping year observations to produce PPP real investment rates for years not covered in Summers, Heston and
Aten (2009). See our Data Appendix (2016) for greater detail. Hsieh & Klenow (1997) convincingly show that poor countries
face higher relative prices of investment goods, but not higher prices of investment goods due to tariffs or quotas. The low
price of consumption goods at home and the low productivity in producing their own capital goods, is the cause of the relative
price disparity between rich and poor countries. We do not adjust for investment in intangible capital. Corrado, Hulten and
Sichel (2009) demonstrate the importance for the US, and presumably other rich countries. However we hypothesize that it
is less important for poorer countries, as we conjecture that it is strongly correlated with R&D. R&D is highly concentrated
in the rich countries.
8One major change between this data and Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006) is in the treatment of physical capital de-
preciation. The earlier paper used a 7% annual depreciation rate. This produced implausibly small capital-output ratios,
significantly less than 2 in 2000. Picketty and Zucman (2014) estimate capital output ratios of 3 or more in 2010 for the top
eight developed economies, and above 3 in the eighteenth and nineteenth century for France, Germany and the UK. In this
paper we used a depreciation rate of 3.33%. For a commonly assumed capital output ratio of 3, a 3.33% depreciation rate
produces a depreciation charge against output of 10% of output, which is at the high end of rates used in public finance. With
the lower depreciation rates, this paper produces much more plausible capital-output ratios. For 1810 Piketty and Zucman
(2014) find reproducible wealth to income ratios of 3.5 (France), 1.8 (US) and 4.2 (UK), these are net of agricultural land.
Using perpetual inventory calculations for many countries produced values quite similar to these using our depreciation rate.
9We use enrollments in schooling for all years that are available in Mitchell’s three volume set, as well as modern day
sources like Human Development Reports and World Development Reports. In addition we use literacy information contained
in Morris and Adelman (1988), Steckel and Floud (1997) and Benavot and Riddle (1988). We follow the rule that it takes
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to this the earliest measures of years of schooling are contained in Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006).10
To compute our initial human capital, we use the same method as in Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006),
Hall & Jones (1999) and Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997).11 We use cross sectional evidence from labor
economists to compute human capital as a function of schooling and experience.12
ht = exp(f(schooling) + g(experience)) (1)
f(E) = .10E (2)
g(experience) = .0495experience− .0495
67
experience2 (3)
Notice that if all countries have reached the same schooling level, as well as the same average experience,
then all countries will have the same human capital.13 This implies that human capital is bounded by the
level of schooling and experience. While schooling would be expected to rise with rising life expectation,
and or falling fertility, schooling cannot grow without bound. Thus human capital would be bounded.
Furthermore this convergence result predicts very rapid convergence in levels of income across countries as
their schooling levels become more similar. Both of these assumptions will be relaxed in later sections in
order to better explain the distribution of income across the countries of the world.
If, however, countries have permanent differences in the level of schooling, then there would be perma-
nent differences in human capital input. Consider two countries, one with 13.75 years of schooling and the
other with 2.15 years of schooling.14 Ignoring the experience term, the relative amount of human capital
three years to become literate, see Harman (1970) and Resnick and Resnick (1977), so if 20 percent of the adult population
is literate, we assume that 20 percent of the population attended school for 3 years, producing a measured schooling level of
.6 years in the population. For more on the details of the computation of schooling in the labor force see our companion data
appendix, Data Appendix for Economic Growth in the Long Run (2016).
10After the main draft of this paper was written, we became aware of Lee & Lee (2016). In their paper, they construct
original estimates of years of schooling using similar and often identical sources as we used. They provide original estimates of
schooling from 1820-2010. Even more fascinating, they provide breakdown by sex, computing separate estimates of schooling
for men and women. We consider our estimates and their estimates to be complementary.
11Recent work by Manuelli and Seshadri (2014), Erosa, Koreshkova and Restuccia (2010) use different human capital
accumulation technologies, In the former a Ben-Porath (1967) model of human capital accumulation is calibrated to the US.
Differing prices of human capital investment goods, and different levels of market TFP can produce large differences in steady
state human capital levels across countries. Their development accounting focuses on the ability to explain the incomes relative
to the US by decile. The model fits extremely well both the schooling distribution, an expenditure shares on education. Most
impressive is the ability to explain the relative income without much variation in TFP. The bottom decile has relative income
of 2%, but their TFP is 63% of the US, thus the overwhelming bulk of differences arise from steady state differences in human
capital. Erosa, et al (2010) use a slightly different approach, but with similar results. A 20 fold difference in output per worker
only requires a 5 fold difference in TFP in the tradable sector because of human capital differences, whereas if human capital
were identical, it would require an 18 fold difference in TFP. In both models higher quality education induces greater human
capital differences, which is consistent with the evidence in Hanushek (2013).
12One difference is that unlike Hall & Jones and Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare, we do not assume decreasing returns to
additional years of schooling. In Turner, Tamura, Mulholland and Baier (2007) there was no evidence of decreasing returns
to schooling over the 160 years of US state data. Banerjee and Duflo (2005) present estimates of Mincer returns to schooling,
Table 1. The average of these estimates is .0995, and if we exclude poor quality data the average is .0958. Thus the human
capital input in high schooling countries will be higher and TFP correspondingly lower than their counterparts computed in
Hall & Jones and Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare.
13We parameterize experience returns as in Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997), and Hall & Jones (1999). The choice of
parameters on experience returns reflects two points, (1) that the returns per year of experience starts at .0495, and (2) peak
earnings occurs at 33.5 years of experience. While this is consistent with the macro literature, it is at odds to cross country
micro evidence of rich and poor countries, see Lagakos, Moll, Porzio and Qian (2013). The authors find that over the life cycle
human capital accumulates more rapidly in rich countries than in poor countries. Typically these cross country differences
in experience returns are ignored in this paper. The one major exception to this are the countries of the Central & Eastern
Europe region. During communism we reduced the market return to years of experience, and after the end of the communist
regime in the Soviet Union, we eliminated all years of experience and reset the counter to 0 in 1990.
14These are the 2010 values of the most educated country, United States, and the least educated country, Eritrea.
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in these countries would be given by:
h(13.75)
h(2.15)
= exp(.1[13.75− 2.15]) = exp(1.16) (4)
With perfect physical capital mobility, and no difference in technology levels, the model would predict that
the more schooled country would be 3.2 times as productive per worker than the less schooled country.
The gap between the US and Eritrea in 2010 is about 45, $76,500 vs. $1707. Human capital measured in
this way explains only about one-sixth of the gap in output per worker.
We summarize the data by regional averages in Figures 1-7.15 We present real output per worker, real
physical capital per worker, schooling per worker, schooling per young worker, human capital and TFP.16
These regional averages are labor force weighted values for each region.17 Regions that have almost
complete coverage in 1820 include: Western Countries, Southern Europe, NIC, Asia and North Africa. In
the case of the Western Countries, we observe France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and the United
States by 1800, and these six countries constitute 83 percent of the Western Countries 2010 labor force.18
We observe Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey of the Southern Europe region in 1820; together they
contain ninety-five percent of the 2010 Southern Europe labor force. All of the NIC countries are observed
in 1820, and Japan in 1800, which by itself is 60% of the 2010 labor force of NIC. In the Asia region, we
observe eight countries in 1820, including China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand; these countries constitute
91 percent of the 2010 Asia labor force. In 1800 we observe eight countries in the Latin America region,
including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela, which represent over
three-fifths of the 2010 Latin America labor force. For the Middle East region, we observe five countries,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in 1820. These five countries represent three-fifths of the 2010 labor
force of the Middle East region. Of the five countries in North Africa, four are observed in 1820. These
constitute 96 percent of the 2010 North Africa labor force.
Figure 1 contains the regional average real output per worker. The Western Countries region has
been home to the world’s highest output per worker countries for over two centuries. The vertical axis
is in log scale, so that constant vertical gaps are constant proportionate differences. In 1820 there are
clearly three equivalence classes. The Western Countries form the highest group, the middle income group
contains the Southern Europe and Middle East, and the rest of the countries are in the lowest income
group. In 2010 there are still three classes: (1) the highest group consisting of Western Countries, NIC
and Southern Europe (average real output per worker of $60,000), (2) the middle group including Middle
East, Central & Eastern Europe, North Africa and Asia (average real output per worker of $15,000), (3) the
lowest group, Sub-Saharan Africa (average real output per worker of $5000). In order to see more clearly
the evolution of these regions, we produce the ratio of the average real output per worker in the Western
15We follow the convention of Lucas (1988) in region composition, with the only exceptions being the placement of Israel
and Turkey in the Southern Europe region. See Appendix Table A1 for a list of countries by region, as well as their first and
last observation information.
16To compute TFP we used a Cobb-Douglas formulation with capital share of .33 and human capital share of .67.
17For 1800 we observe Western Countries, Southern Europe, N.I.C., Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. All other
regions we observe in 1820. Our first observation in each region consists of countries whose labor force in 2010 constitutes
at least half of the region’s 2010 total labor force. The only exceptions to this rule are Southern Europe where we observe
Portugal and Spain in 1800, which represent one third of the 2010 labor force for Southern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, where
we observe only South Africa, which represents slightly more than five percent of the 2010 labor force in Sub-Saharan Africa,
and Central & Eastern Europe where we observe the Czech Republic, and Russia, which represents 42 percent of the 2010
labor force of Central & Eastern Europe.
18We observe the UK in 1801.
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Countries relative to the average real output per worker in the other eight regions. This is presented in
Figure 2. Only one region, NIC has converged relative to Western Countries between 1820 and 2010.
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Figure 1: Real Output Per Worker: by Region
Figure 3 contains the regional average real physical capital per worker. Physical capital mirrors real
output per worker.19 There are three equivalence classes of real physical capital per worker in 2010. The
top group contains N.I.C., Western Countries and Southern Europe. The middle group contains Middle
East, Central & Eastern Europe, North Africa and Asia. The lowest group contains Sub-Saharan Africa. In
2010, the typical worker in the top group uses $270,000 of real physical capital. In comparison workers in
the middle group and the bottom group only have real physical capital of $42,000 and $11,500, respectively.
Figure 4 contains the regional average schooling per worker. If it takes 3 years of schooling to provide
basic literacy, then the typical worker of Western Countries was literate in 1850.20 Literacy of the typical
worker outside of this region happened much later: 1920 Southern Europe, 1930 Central & Eastern Europe,
1910 NIC, 1965 Asia, 1980 Sub-Saharan Africa, 1950 Latin America, 1975 Middle East, and 1970 North
Africa. Thus the regions that behaved most like Western Countries, Southern Europe and NIC, attained
literate work forces no later than 70 years after Western Countries’ attainment.21 As with output per
19By construction we imposed an additional higher depreciation rates on Central & Eastern Europe countries between 1990
and 2000. For all countries in the Central & Eastern Europe region, we depreciated 1990 physical capital by 50% to take
into account the market pricing of capital, see our Data Appendix for more details. In addition for some of these countries
we depreciated capital between 2000 and 2010 at an additional rate, typically 14%. Again see our Data Appendix for more
details.
20Mitch, (1984, 2004), uses three years of schooling as a sufficient level of schooling for basic literacy. UNESCO uses four
years as minimum required level of schooling for literacy, see also Harman (1970) and Resnick and Resnick (1977).
21While the Central & Eastern Europe region attained literate workforce by 1930, their failure to join Southern Europe and
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Figure 2: Relative Real Output Per Worker: by Region
worker and physical capital per worker, there are three equivalence classes of worker education: the top
tier includes Western Countries, N.I.C., Southern Europe and Central & Eastern Europe. The middle tier
contains Latin America, North Africa, Middle East and Asia. The bottom group is made up of Sub-Saharan
Africa.
Outside of the top tier, the lagging regions took at least a century or more to make the typical worker
literate. This can be seen in Figure 5, where we graph the regional average years of schooling of the
youngest worker cohort. Young workers were literate in Western Countries by 1830, followed by 1880
young Southern Europe workers. The young workers of N.I.C. became literate by 1890.22 Young workers
of Central & Eastern Europe did not attain literacy until 1910. Young workers in Asia became literate by
1950. Youngsters of Latin America were literate by 1930, but their North Africa brethren did not become
literate until around 1955. Young workers of Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa were literate by 1965.
We see in both Figures 4 and 5 that there are three equivalence classes in education. With the exception
of Central & Eastern Europe, which is in the top education class compared with their middle output and
physical capital classifications, all the other group memberships remain the same. Focusing on young
workers, the average years of schooling for the youngest worker cohort in the top group is 13.7 years. The
middle and bottom education group for young workers have average schooling of 10.1 years and 7.7 years,
respectively. Thus the best educated young workers have something like 2 years of schooling beyond high
school, whereas their counterparts have 2 years of high school in the middle group, and primary schooling
NIC in the first output per worker equivalence class group shows the lower institutional productivity of centrally planned vs.
market based economies.
22However the N.I.C. begin catching up faster than all other regions, starting in 1870.
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Figure 3: Real Physical Capital Per Worker: by Region
in the bottom group.23
Using the Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999) method for computing human
capital based on schooling and average experience we construct human capital by region. These are
presented in Figure 6. As with education per worker and per young worker, there exists three equivalence
classes of countries in human capital per worker. For any country i, we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas
production technology, using total factor productivity, Zit, in combination with physical capital per worker,
Kit, and human capital per worker, Hit, to produce output per worker, Yit:
Yit = ZitK
α
itH
1−α
it , (5)
where α = .33, similar to that found in Gollin (2002), and used by Caselli (2005) and Turner, Tamura and
Mulholland (2013). Figure 7 contains the regional average TFP. The Western Countries have been the world
leader in TFP, although since 1950 the N.I.C. and Southern Europe, Middle East and surprisingly Central
& Eastern Europe have converged. There are two more equivalence classes; the middle group consisting
of Latin America, North Africa and Asia, and the bottom group of Sub-Saharan Africa. Interestingly
membership in the bottom group usually included Asia, and in fact from 1900-1980, Asia was below even
the Sub-Saharan Africa region. This reverses in 2000, and by 2010, Asia is clearly in the middle group.
This obviously reflects the market reforms in China since 1979 and India from 1990 onward. There has
been a clear TFP slowdown since 1970 throughout the world, excluding Asia.24
23We are explicitly using the US schooling measures, 8 years of primary schooling and 4 years of high school.
24We conjecture that a fair amount of this is mismeasured output. There has been a dramatic increase in life expectancy,
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Figure 4: Education Per Worker: by Region
One consistent theme emerges from the Figures. There exists three different development groups: rich,
middle and poor. The poor group in all measures of output, inputs and TFP is the Sub-Saharan Africa
group. The top group in output, inputs and TFP always includes Western Countries, Southern Europe and
N.I.C. The middle group in output, inputs and TFP always includes Latin America, North Africa, Asia.
The middle group also includes Middle East in every category, except for TFP, where the Middle East is
more closely related to the top group. Finally the Central & Eastern Europe region is a middle group in
output per worker, and physical capital per worker, but a top group region for schooling, human capital
and TFP.
a sharp reduction in air and water pollution in the developed world, and a dramatic increase in worker safety. None of these
are priced in GDP. Murphy and Topel (2006) estimate that the US gains in life expectancy over 1970-2000 added about 3.2
trillion $ per year to national wealth in the US!
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Figure 5: Education Per Young Worker: by Region
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Figure 6: Human Capital Per Worker, Base: by Region
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Figure 7: Total Factor Productivity, Base: by Region
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3 Growth Accounting
In this section we report growth accounting results. We summarize the data in three ways: (1) we
weight the data by the 2010 labor force multiplied by the number of years of observation; we call this
the labor force-duration estimates, (2) we weight each country by their 2010 labor force, (3) all countries
are treated equally. In earlier works, like Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997), each country’s growth rates
are equally weighted. In data sets where all countries are observed over the same time period this makes
some sense, c.f. Easterly and Levine (2001). However it does have the disadvantage of equally weighting
economic performance achieved in a country like China, with a labor force of three-quarters of a billion,
the same as a country with fewer than 100,000 workers, like Seychelles. In addition if the number of years
a country is observed differs greatly, then a country that achieves annualized growth rate of 1.4% for 220
years (US) is treated the same as a country which manages annualized 2.3% growth for 20 years (Slovak
Republic). In the former living standards are 22 times their initial value, whereas in the latter case living
standards are only 60% higher than the initial observation.
Growth accounting produces the relationship in growth rates:
gi =
lnyiT − lnyiti0
T − ti0 =
lnZiT − lnZiti0 + α(lnKiT − lnKiti0) + (1− α)(lnHiT − lnHiti0)
T − ti0 (6)
In the first third of Table 1 we present the labor force-duration weighted results. The middle third of
the table weights each country’s observation by their 2010 labor force, and the final third of the table is
unweighted. There is little difference between the two weighted results. In both weighted cases real output
per worker growth is 1.24% per year, with real input per worker growth of about .72% per year. Over the
two weighted cases, input growth explains almost 60 percent of output per worker growth, with a range of
55% for Asia to 94% for Central & Eastern Europe. In both weighted cases, all regions have positive TFP
growth. In the unweighted case, the worker in the typical country had annualized growth rates of 1.32%
for output, .90% for inputs, and .42% for TFP. Input growth accounts for almost 70% of measured output
per worker growth.25 In contrast, in BDT, the worker in the typical country had annualized growth rates
of .74% for output, 1.55% for inputs, and −.81% for TFP. A comparison of the different regions shows that
all regions now have positive economic growth. They range from a high of 2.54% per year real output
growth in Southern Europe to a low of .90% per year in Central & Eastern Europe. Only the Central &
Eastern Europe region has negative TFP growth.
25The work of Alwyn Young with regards to the NIC’s is relevant. He showed that TFP growth was much lower when
input growth was appropriately measured. TFP growth for the NIC’s was still higher than for rich countries like the US, but
accounted for a smaller share of the overall growth than originally estimated.
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Table 1: Growth Accounting
% Annualized Growth Rates
Region N y k hc inputs TFP input TFP
gy gk gh gx gz share share
Labor Force-Duration Weights
World 168 1.24 1.19 0.49 0.72 0.51 0.584 0.416
(wc) Western Countries 18 1.42 1.43 0.52 0.82 0.60 0.579 0.421
(se) Southern Europe 8 1.46 1.64 0.57 0.92 0.54 0.630 0.370
(see) Central and Eastern Europe 24 1.37 1.41 0.77 0.98 0.39 0.716 0.284
(nic) Newly Industrialized Countries 5 1.83 2.07 0.57 1.06 0.77 0.580 0.420
(asia) Asia 20 1.15 1.10 0.43 0.65 0.50 0.569 0.431
(ssa) Sub-Saharan Africa 48 1.16 0.54 0.73 0.67 0.49 0.579 0.421
(la) Latin America 28 1.20 1.15 0.50 0.71 0.49 0.592 0.408
(me) Middle East 12 1.16 1.10 0.57 0.68 0.48 0.585 0.415
(na) North Africa 5 1.21 1.18 0.49 0.72 0.49 0.596 0.404
Labor Force Weights
World 168 1.24 1.11 0.54 0.73 0.51 0.589 0.411
wc 18 1.42 1.44 0.52 0.82 0.60 0.579 0.421
se 8 1.53 1.69 0.58 0.94 0.58 0.618 0.382
cee 24 1.08 1.13 0.96 1.02 0.06 0.943 0.057
nic 5 1.84 2.07 0.57 1.06 0.78 0.578 0.422
asia 20 1.19 1.10 0.44 0.66 0.53 0.554 0.446
ssa 48 1.17 0.43 0.78 0.66 0.51 0.566 0.434
la 28 1.20 1.14 0.53 0.73 0.47 0.608 0.392
me 12 1.22 1.15 0.72 0.70 0.52 0.576 0.424
na 5 1.22 1.17 0.52 0.74 0.48 0.603 0.397
Unweighted
World 168 1.32 1.15 0.82 0.90 0.42 0.684 0.316
wc 18 1.69 1.79 0.55 0.96 0.73 0.567 0.433
se 8 2.54 2.51 0.73 1.32 1.22 0.519 0.481
cee 24 0.90 0.85 1.36 1.19 -0.29 1.324 -0.324
nic 5 1.92 2.01 0.55 1.03 0.88 0.540 0.460
asia 20 1.38 1.16 0.63 0.81 0.57 0.585 0.415
ssa 48 1.22 0.73 0.85 0.81 0.41 0.661 0.339
la 28 1.28 1.26 0.73 0.91 0.37 0.709 0.291
me 12 0.93 0.89 0.83 0.47 0.46 0.507 0.493
na 5 1.34 1.24 0.68 0.86 0.48 0.645 0.355
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4 Variance Decomposition
There is a wide range of growth rates in the data, and it is useful to ask how much of the variation in
output growth rates can be directly tied to variation in input growth rates. The previous literature have
found that most of the variation in growth rates are accounted for by variation in TFP growth rates. In
this section we present the results of the variance decomposition of growth rates. We construct plausible
upper bounds on the share of real output per worker growth variance explained by variations in real input
growth rates and variations in TFP growth rates. We proceed as in Turner, Tamura, and Mulholland
(2013). We aggregate inputs, physical capital per worker and human capital per worker, into the single
measure Xt. Thus output per worker is given as:
Xt = K
α
t H
1−α
t (7)
Yt = ZtXt (8)
Taking logs and using gs represent growth rate of s produces:
gy = gz + gx (9)
Although our countries all are observed in 2010, we first observe the US in 1790, while for others we first
observe as late as 1990.26 For each country we construct the annualized growth rates of output per worker,
input per worker and TFP over the entire observation length of the country. The variance of the annual
growth rate of output per worker across these countries is given by:
σ2gy = σ
2
gz + 2σgx,gz + σ
2
gx (10)
In much of the empirical growth and development literature it is standard to allocate one-half of the
covariance terms to the inputs and one-half of the covariance terms to the residual, TFP, term, see Klenow
& Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Caselli (2005), Weil (2009). This “egalitarian” assignment is then used to discuss
the proportion of the variance of annual growth rates in output per worker “explained” or “accounted” for
by inputs and the remainder allocated to TFP. This assignment can also be written as:
σ2gy = σgx,gy + σgz,gy (11)
1 =
σgx,gy
σ2gy
+
σgz,gy
σ2gy
(12)
Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997) also argue that a better way to think about the contributions of input
growth and TFP growth is to only credit variations in the growth rate of capital intensity to inputs. We
modify this slightly by assuming human capital growth rates are not induced by TFP growth rates, but
acknowledge that growth rates of physical capital could be induced by TFP growth rates. Thus rewrite
26East Germany is only observed from 1950-1990.
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the output equation as:
Yt = (
Kt
Yt
)
α
1−αZ
α
1−α
t Ht (13)
Yt = ZˆtXˆt (14)
Xˆt = (
Kt
Yt
)
α
1−αHt (15)
Zˆt = Z
α
1−α
t (16)
Proceeding as before we can compute the growth rates of output per worker, and the new inputs per worker
and TFP and produce:
σ2gy = σgxˆ,gy + σgzˆ,gy (17)
1 =
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
+
σgzˆ,gy
σ2gy
(18)
These two variance decomposition methods proposed by Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997) arise from
priors as to the causal link of the correlation of growth rates of inputs and TFP. Under (18) the proportion
of growth rate variations that co-vary with input (TFP) growth variations is assigned to inputs (TFP).
Under (18) a priori TFP growth variations induce physical capital growth rate variations, and only physical
capital intensity growth rate variations are ascribed to inputs. Further it is assumed in (18) that human
capital growth rate variations are not induced by TFP growth rate variations.27
Returning to the original variance decomposition and dividing by the variance of growth rate of output
per worker also produces:
1 =
σ2gz
σ2gy
+
σ2gx
σ2gy
+ 2ρx,z
σgxσgz
σ2gy
(19)
However as noted above the correlation of growth rates of inputs and total factor productivity growth is
not zero. However, a priori it is not clear that the appropriate decomposition implies equal split of the
covariance term between inputs and TFP, nor to favor TFP as in the Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare capital
intensity approach. Even if endogenous technological progress was the best model of TFP growth, it does
not automatically follow that input accumulation is not logically prior to TFP growth. Not all societies
purposely spend to invent new products, and processes. The societies that do accumulate new goods and
processes are also the highest human capital economies and with the most physical capital. Thus we use
another method of variance decomposition in order to allow the data inform us which economic theories
of growth are more likely. This is not a Bayesian approach strictly, but one that produces what we term
plausible shares or plausible explanations.
We proceed as in Turner, Tamura and Mulholland (2013). There are two sets of theories that explain
the correlation between input growth and TFP growth. The exogenous technological growth neoclassical
growth model implies that factor accumulation is induced by the growth in TFP. The same induced input
accumulation result arises from endogenous technological progress models, e.g. Romer (1990). At the
opposing end of the assignment, Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), and Tamura (2002,2006) construct theories
27Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997) assume that human capital growth rates may be induced by TFP growth rates, and
hence only capital intensity, inclusive of both physical capital intensity and human capital intensity are varying “independently”
from TFP growth rate variations.
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in which physical capital accumulation or human capital accumulation induces endogenous TFP growth.
These theories imply that the correlation between TFP growth and input growth are due to input growth
and hence the correlated or predictable component should be assigned to input growth.
If TFP growth induces factor accumulation, then the predictable or correlated portion of input growth
should be assigned to TFP growth, the share of growth of output per worker variation can be written as:
1 =
(σgz + σgxρgx,gz )
2
σ2gy
+
(1− ρ2gx,gz )σ2gx
σ2gy
(20)
where the first term is now a plausible upper bound on the proportion of the variation in growth rates of
output per worker caused by variation in growth rates of TFP.28 If the predictable or correlated component
of TFP growth arises from endogenous factor accumulation, then assigning this predictable component to
factor accumulation produces the following variance decomposition:
1 =
(σgx + σgzρgx,gz )
2
σ2gy
+
(1− ρ2gx,gz )σ2gz
σ2gy
(21)
The first term is now the proportion of the variation of growth rates of output per worker that is explained
by variation in input growth.29 Since it is not obvious which of the theories is true, we propose to let the
data guide us. As in Turner, Tamura and Mulholland (2013), we construct the average of the contributions
for inputs and TFP and compare them with the other decompositions. Thus we produce the average BDT
decompositions as:
Sgx =
σ2gx
σ2gy
+
1
2
ρ2gx,gz
(
σ2gz − σ2gx
)
σ2gy
+
σgxσgzρgx,gz
σ2gy
(22)
Sgz =
σ2gz
σ2gy
+
1
2
ρ2gx,gz
(
σ2gx − σ2gz
)
σ2gy
+
σgxσgzρgx,gz
σ2gy
(23)
The results of these three bounds, (12), (18), (22)-(23), are contained in Table 2.30 Columns (1) and (2)
28One way of seeing that the least squares decomposition holds for this representation is to note that the variance decom-
position is σ2gy + σ
2
egy|gz
+β2gy,gzσ
2
gz
where βgy,gz is the regression coefficient from a regression of gy on gz and egy|gz is the
regression residual.
29One way of seeing that the least squares decomposition holds for this representation is to note that the variance decom-
position is σ2gy = β
2
gy,gx
σ2gx + σ
2
egy|gx
, where βgy,gx is the regression coefficient from a regression of gy on gx and egy|gx is
the regression residual.
30All of these calculations assumes that the correlation between growth of inputs and growth of TFP is positive. A
negative correlation has several possible explanations. One possibility is measurement error. If we systematically overestimate
growth of inputs, we downwardly bias the growth rate of TFP. Some of this could arise from investment that is driven by
the government, see below. However for private investment, we would assume that over the very long run, investments have
a positive return, and produce measurable results. Anything that reduces allocative efficiency such as institutional change
that reduces property rights, that fosters corruption, etc. can produce large negative TFP growth. One that does not make
economic sense is forgetting. While it is possible to forget technology, and it has happened to some peoples in Europe after
the fall of the Roman Empire, as well in China after the fall of the Qin Empire and the rise of the Han Empire, over the
1800-2010 period there is a reduced sense of forgetting. It is possible that the conversion of economies toward central planning
after World War II in Central and Eastern Europe and the switch back from central planning to market based economies
after the fall of the Soviet Union can be captured as forgetting. Communist collectivization and rising capital accumulation
would more likely than not produce falling TFP, e.g. Maoist China. Centrally planned accumulation of inputs that have
extremely low returns, building zero value public roads, investing in “critical” private sector industries that no profit making
investor would ever authorize, spending on “education,” but failing to provide the basics such as textbooks, blackboard an
chalk, qualified teachers, etc. All of these would be measured as productive factor accumulations, that have 0 or possibly
negative returns.
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present the relative importance based on covariance shares of input growth rates and TFP growth rates.
Columns (3) and (4) contain the covariance shares of relative input intensity growth rates and TFP growth
rates. Columns (5) and (6) contain the shares from the average BDT decomposition. In columns (7) and
(8) we also report the average BDT decomposition, but using the BDT data. Comparing the results for all
countries, there is a big increase in explanatory power contained in input growth variation compared with
BDT and Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997). The increase in years of coverage as well the increase in number
of countries observed, results in a substantial rise in the input share of growth rate variation. Whereas
only 22% of growth rate variation is explained using the BDT average decomposition before, column (7),
now 46% of output growth rate variation is explained by input growth variation. Using the standard
covariance share, produces a similar 46% explanatory share for input growth rate variations. Only the
more restrictive Klendow & Rodriguez-Clare covariance share of physical capital intensity variations lowers
the explanatory power of input growth rate variations, 24%. Still this is an increase from the 3% share found
by Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare. Comparing column (5) with (7) is informative. While the overall increase
Table 2: Growth Variance Decomposition: Plausible Shares
egalitarian capital intensity plausible shares plausible shares
covariance share covariance share new data BDT data
Region N
σgx,gy
σ2gy
σgz,gy
σ2gy
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
σgzˆ,gy
σ2gy
Sgx Sgz Sgx Sgz
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
World 168 0.455 0.545 0.238 0.762 0.458 0.542 .22 .78
wc 18 0.344 0.656 0.022 0.978 0.408 0.592 .46 .54
se 8 0.368 0.632 0.057 0.943 0.496 0.504 .50 .50
cee 24 0.554 0.446 0.334 0.666 0.548 0.452 .28 .72
nic 5 0.097 0.903 -0.348 1.348 0.171 0.829 .64 .36
asia 20 0.475 0.525 0.217 0.783 0.478 0.522 .40 .60
ssa 48 0.417 0.583 0.130 0.870 0.447 0.553 .37 .63
la 28 0.408 0.592 0.117 0.883 0.439 0.561 .22 .78
me 12 0.719 0.281 0.833 0.167 0.666 0.334 .44 .56
na 5 1.145 -0.145 1.217 -0.217 0.761 0.239 .84 .16
larger regions
(1): wc & nic 23 0.341 0.659 0.017 0.983 0.403 0.597
(2): (1) & se 31 0.373 0.627 0.065 0.935 0.482 0.518
(3): (2) & na 36 0.376 0.624 0.069 0.931 0.476 0.524
(4); (3) & asia 56 0.408 0.592 0.117 0.883 0.453 0.547
(5): (4) & la 84 0.393 0.607 0.095 0.905 0.439 0.561
(6); (5) & ssa 132 0.406 0.594 0.113 0.887 0.443 0.557
(7): (6) & me (no opec) 135 0.406 0.594 0.114 0.886 0.443 0.557
(8): (7) & cee 159 0.399 0.601 0.103 0.897 0.405 0.595
in explanatory power in input growth variations is large, 46% vs. 22%, the change in explanatory power of
input growth variations by region is heterogeneous. Five out of nine regions increase in explanatory power
of input growth variations, while three decrease in explanatory power, and one is constant. In contrast to
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previous work, e.g. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), there is increased explanatory power in variations
in input growth rates, however there is still much left unexplained. Looking at larger groups of regions,
the bottom half of Table 2 shows that the variance decomposition results are robust. Using either the
standard covariance accounting, or the average BDT decomposition, we see that the variation explained by
input variation stabilizes around 40%. The more restrictive Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare capital intensity
covariance accounting converges to 10%. Clearly there is more work to do, and to this we now turn.
5 Intergenerational Human Capital Calculation
One conclusion from above is that despite adding many additional years of observations, and a non-
trivial number of new countries, output per worker growth rate variation still is better explained by TFP
growth rate variation (average BDT decomposition or covariance decomposition), or almost completely
captured by TFP growth rate variation (Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare capital intensity input). To see how
robust TFP growth differences are for explaining differential growth, we return to some theories of en-
dogenous growth. In particular we examine the role of human capital accumulation in promoting growth
of output per worker. The original Lucas (1988), Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), Tamura (1994),
Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2004), Galor (2005) papers introduce the idea that time spent
away from production can be used to accumulate human capital.31 In Lucas (1988) infinite lived agents
perpetually accumulate human capital, whereas in all of the other papers, parents spend time away from
production and educate their children. In both of these models human capital builds off of the existing
human capital, hence accumulation has the property of standing on the shoulders of others. Allowing
for human capital spillovers across borders as in Tamura (1991, 1996, 2002, 2006) produces the following
specification for country i between generations t and t+ 1:
hit+1 = Ah
ρ
th
β− ρ10
it exp(f(schooling) + g(experience)) (24)
where hit represents the human capital of the parent, ht represents the frontier human capital in the world,
ρ is the degree to which the frontier human capital can be diffused through teaching, and the two functions,
f and g in the exponential are defined as in (2) and (3), 0 < ρ, β < 1, ρ + .9β ≤ 1.32 A closer look at the
accumulation function is useful. The Mincer component is standard, but notice that if children receive no
schooling, they still have human capital as an adult, given by Ahβitexp(f(0)+g(experience)) > 0 This allows
31Rosen (1976) actually originally produces perpetual endogenous growth in a human capital model, but discards it in favor
of one with standard life cycle properties.
32If ρ + .9β = 1, then perpetual endogenous growth is possible; this formulation is used in Tamura, Simon and Murphy
(2016) examining human capital convergence across states and races in the US from 1840 to 2000. If ρ + .9β < 1, then a
steady state human capital level exists, once schooling becomes constant. Either technological progress in output production,
or rising A would be required for perpetual growth. One possibility for rising A would be if A grew as a function of the numbers
enrolled in higher education, or the cumulative stock of higher education exposed workers. These would be consistent with
Jones (1995a,1995b, 2001).
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for human capital to be passed through generations without formal schooling, and includes genetic-ability
transfers, cultural norms of work effort. Notice that without formal schooling, the state of the art h term is
not available to the children. This captures the idea that either literacy is required as the spillover occurs
through books, or possibly that domestic teachers are hired that have either been exposed themselves to
this knowledge via higher education, or that teachers can be hired in an international market.33 The key
innovation here is that we allow for intergenerational accumulation in human capital.34
We initialized 15-24 year old human capital in a country using information on the output per worker
relative to the US.35 The virtues of this method are twofold: (1) it allows for human capital across
generations to accumulate, while allowing for the possibility of late developers to converge to the human
capital level of early developers via the spillover effect, (2) it keeps a demographic age structure of human
capital in the population that incorporates the Mincer age earnings quadratic profile. That is to say, if we
compare individuals in a country of the same age, but different schooling levels, their earnings would differ
by exp(f(schooling) + g(experience)) and be consistent with Mincerian wage regressions on returns to
schooling. Second if we compare individuals in a country over their life cycle, their human capital has the
standard inverted U-shape age earnings profile consistent with Mincerian wage regressions. Now consider
the ability of this specification to capture differences in long run human capital levels. First assume that
there is no spillover, i.e. ρ = 0. Consider two economies, one where each generation attains 14.6 years
of schooling, and one where each generation attains only 2.2 years of schooling, this is equal to the 2010
young worker schooling gap between the least schooled country, Eritrea, and the most schooled country,
the United States. Ignoring experience returns, the stationary human capital values of these respective
countries are given by:
h(14.6) = A
1
1−β exp(
1.46
1− β ) (25)
h(2.2) = A
1
1−β exp(
.22
1− β ) (26)
h(14.6)
h(2.2)
= exp(
1.24
1− β ) (27)
Compared to the human capital accumulation technology without intergenerational human capital accumu-
33This interpretation of the spillover is consistent with Tamura (2001).
34This is similar to the specification in Bils and Klenow (2000), although in their model they do not allow for spillovers
across countries.
35We did not follow an explicit rule in creating our initial human capital values. A brief description of our assignment
methodology is as follows. We construct initial output per worker relative to the US output per worker in the comparable
decade. Let E15−24it be the 15 to 24 year old cohort’s education in initial year t in country i. Let E
15−24
USt be the 15 to 24
year old US cohort’s education in year t. Schoellman (2012) finds that a very good approximation to human capital adjusting
for school quality differences is simply given by exp(.2*years of schooling). Thus using Schoellman (2012) we construct initial
relative young human capital as exp(.2 ∗ [E15−24it −E15−24USt ]). Our initial young human capital for country i in year t relative
to the US is well described by a log linear regression on log relative output per worker, log relative human capital from
Schoellman (given above), region dummies and a few other region or country variables. Table A1 in the Appendix lists the
initial human capital for workers age 15-24 and the initial average human capital for each country, as well as the 2010 values.
See section 1.5 of our data appendix for full details.
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lation, this specification accentuates permanent differences in schooling. For a value of β = .375, the model
delivers a 7.25 relative human capital gap between these two countries, about one-sixth of the 2010 income
difference between the US ($76,500) and Eritrea ($1707).36 Without intergenerational human capital the
human capital gap between these two countries would be 3.5 or one-thirteenth of the income difference
between the US and Eritrea.37
We constructed the human capital in a country as the population weighted average of human capital of
5 age groups, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64. Human capital in country i in year t is:
Hit = s
1524
it h
1524
it + s
2534
it h
2534
it + s
3544
it h
3544
it + s
4554
it h
4554
it + s
5564
it h
5564
it (28)
where sit is the share of the population in age category i in year t, and human capital accumulates via the
age earnings profile from above, for example:
h3544it+1 = h
2534
it exp(g(experience
2534
i + 10)− g(experience2534i )) (29)
where each generation is assumed to have an average schooling and hence their first set of expected expe-
rience in the age group 15-24 is given by:
experience1524 = max(0, avg age1524 − 6− avg schooling1524) (30)
and from then on, every observation they age 10 years.38 For the new generation, represented by h1524 we
assume that the parents are between the ages of 35-54 today. That is to say we use the arithmetic average
human capital of adults 25-34 and 35-44 in the prior observation to produce human capital for current
15-24 children. This assumes parents had their children between the ages of 20-39. Our intergenerational
human capital accumulation equation is:
h1524it = Ah
ρ
t−1
(
h2534it−1 + h
3544
it−1
2
)β− ρ10
exp(f(schooling) + g(experience)) (31)
where, β = .375, A = .38028169, f(schooling) and g(experience) are given by (2) and (3), where initial
experience is max(0,average age - 6 - expected schooling of cohort born in period t-1).39 In our human
36For a larger value, β = 2
3
, the income gap would be almost exactly explained.
37Of course in transition the US could have a much larger relative human capital advantage.
38The human capital arising from experience returns are different for Central and Eastern Europe during communism.
Over the period of post World War II communist central planning, the typical return is .0625*.0495 per year of experience,
see our Data Appendix for details. Before the post World War II communist period, the returns to labor market experience
are identical with all other countries. However the way we compute market return we remove all experience return that was
gained prior to 1950, and evaluate all experience at the new lower rate, .0625*.0495. This causes human capital between
the pre war period to fall in the post war period. Additionally after 2000 we eliminated all human capital accumulation
from experience, and restarted their experience measure at 0 in year 2000. We do this to capture the shock of a completely
new system of production, mixed or market based, and the complete depreciation of experience arising from life under the
communist system.
39In our robustness checks we varied β and ρ. With one exception, we kept constant, β + ρ = .725. The exception was
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capital calculations the time subscripts refer to birth cohort, and typically are spaced 10 years apart. The
human capital of 15-24 year olds in 1860 use the school enrollment rates in 1850 to produce an estimate
of expected years of schooling. Our choice of β = .375, A = .38028169 come from micro evidence of the
intergenerational elasticity of earnings, and from a grid search of values from .25 to .65 for A.40 Table 3
lists estimates of intergenerational elasticity of earnings, β. This summarizes previous research with 299
estimates of β. Our functional form allows for a maximum own parental effect, at 0 years of child schooling,
β = .375. For a value ρ = .35, then the own parental effect declines to β = .340. The high value is nearly
identical to the average of estimates, and the low value is nearly identical to the median of the estimates.
Table 3: Estimates of Intergenerational Elasticity of Earnings: β
Country links estimate median source
range estimate estimate
USA father & sons [.146, .495] .327 Table 4 Olivetti & Paserman
USA father & sons in law [.180, .493] .340 Table 4 Olivetti & Paserman
USA father & sons [.005, .275] .261 Table 4.2 Grawe
USA father & sons [.355, .535] .535 Table 4.2 Grawe
Canada father & sons [.110, .256] .211 Table 4.3 Grawe
Germany father & sons [-.280, .313] .065 Table 4.4 Grawe
UK father & sons [.344, .814] .579 Table 4.5 Grawe
Malaysia father & sons [.283, .791] .537 Table 4.6 Grawe
Nepal father & sons [.333, .539] .436 Table 4.8 Grawe
Pakistan father & sons [.153, .773] .463 Table 4.8 Grawe
USA parents & sons [.302, .521] .343 Table 5.5 Mayer & Lopoo
USA parents & daughters [.289, .469] .363 Table 5.5 Mayer & Lopoo
USA father & sons [.106, .416] .368 Table 3 Lefgren, Lindquist & Sims
multiple father & children [.110, .600] .400 Table 7.5 Mulligan
multiple father & sons [.130, .570] .240 Table 1 Solon
multiple father & sons [-.044, .707] .356 Table 4 & appendix Bjorklund & Jantti
[avg low, avg high] [.158, .535] median=.344
average = .367
We first assumed no spillover in the human capital accumulation function, i.e. ρ = 0.41 Figures 8
and 9 present the regional graphs of human capital per worker and TFP. In both figures we computed
the average human capital and TFP weighting by the labor force. There is more rapid growth in human
capital and thus slower growth in TFP. Figures 8 and 9 are both on log scale, so vertical gaps represent
proportionate differences. For human capital, in Figure 8, the vertical distance between the top region and
the bottom region appears quite stable, and hence the world relative distributions of human capital appear
when we examined β = .375, ρ = 0. In addition to keeping the sum of β + ρ = .725, we kept the share of world mean growth
explained by inputs, in the weighted duration-labor force case constant. We did this by varying A.
40We also did robustness check on our results by varying β = .025 to β = .7. These are reported later.
41For this case we assumed A = .5696268.
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to be stable.42 As before there is a cluster of three equivalence classes: high human capital (including
Western Countries, N.I.C. and Southern Europe), a middle human capital group (including Asia, Central
& Eastern Europe, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East), and a low human capital group,
Sub-Saharan Africa. For TFP, in Figure 9, the final distribution contains really only two groups: a low
TFP group containing Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, and a high TFP group consisting of all other regions.
The growth accounting results and the results from the variance decomposition of growth rates are
contained in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. There is a large increase in the share of overall growth explained
by input growth in all cases. Whereas previously inputs explained between 60% and 70% of growth, they
now explain between 80% and 85% of growth. Table 5 shows the value of introducing intergenerational
human capital accumulation for explaining cross sectional variation in long run growth rates.
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Figure 8: Human Capital Per Worker, β = .375, ρ = 0: by Region
Whereas Table 2 shows that variation in input growth explains 46% of the variation in output per worker
growth, the introduction intergenerational accumulation raises the share of input growth rate variation to
96%. The increase is broad based; all regions outside of North Africa, have higher or equal shares of
growth rate variation captured by input growth rate variation, when comparing any of the three variance
decompositions, cols (1), (3) and (5), in Table 5 with their counterparts in Table 2. When we look
at larger regions, the improved ability of input growth variations to explain output per worker growth
42This is similar in flavor to a point made previously by Parente and Prescott (1993) about relative output.
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Figure 9: Total Factor Productivity, β = .375, ρ = 0: by Region
variations continues. At least 90% of growth rate variations are captured by input growth rate variations
for all combinations of regions in the lower panel of Table 5. This is true whether we use the standard
covariance accounting, the plausible shares (average BDT decomposition) or the more conservative Klenow
& Rodriguez-Clare capital intensity covariance accounting. It is problematic that two covariance accounting
results produce greater than 100% explanatory power, for Southern Europe and N.I.C, as well as Middle
East using Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare capital intensity decomposition, and in the larger aggregates up
through the inclusion of Latin America. The great disparity in input shares across regions, the excessive
input share for the N.i.C region and the greater than 100% share for large regions up to an including Latin
America indicate that the intergenerational model needs some modification.
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Table 4: Growth Accounting: New Human Capital β = .375, ρ = 0
% Annualized Growth Rates input TFP
Region N gy gk gh gx gz share share
Labor Force-Duration Weights
World 168 1.24 1.19 0.97 1.04 0.19 0.843 0.157
(wc) Western Countries 18 1.42 1.43 1.04 1.17 0.25 0.826 0.174
(se) Southern Europe 8 1.46 1.64 1.13 1.29 0.17 0.885 0.115
(see) Central & Eastern Europe 24 1.37 1.41 0.95 1.10 0.27 0.800 0.200
(nic) Newly Industrialized Countries 5 1.83 2.07 1.56 1.73 0.11 0.942 0.058
(asia) Asia 20 1.15 1.10 0.95 1.00 0.15 0.870 0.130
(ssa) Sub-Saharan Africa 48 1.16 0.54 1.01 0.85 0.30 0.739 0.261
(la) Latin America 28 1.20 1.15 0.69 0.84 0.36 0.699 0.301
(me) Middle East 12 1.16 1.10 0.97 0.94 0.22 0.806 0.194
(na) North Africa 5 1.21 1.18 1.05 1.09 0.11 0.907 0.093
Labor Force Weights
World 168 1.24 1.12 0.99 1.03 0.20 0.834 0.166
wc 18 1.42 1.44 1.05 1.18 0.25 0.827 0.173
se 8 1.53 1.68 1.17 1.34 0.19 0.876 0.124
cee 24 1.08 1.13 0.55 0.74 0.34 0.685 0.315
nic 5 1.84 2.07 1.57 1.74 0.10 0.946 0.054
asia 20 1.19 1.10 1.01 1.04 0.15 0.874 0.126
ssa 48 1.17 0.43 1.10 0.88 0.29 0.750 0.250
la 28 1.20 1.14 0.70 0.85 0.36 0.703 0.297
me 12 1.22 1.15 1.18 0.99 0.22 0.815 0.185
na 5 1.22 1.17 1.07 1.10 0.12 0.904 0.096
Unweighted
World 168 1.32 1.15 1.04 1.06 0.26 0.800 0.200
wc 18 1.69 1.79 1.23 1.41 0.27 0.837 0.163
se 8 2.54 2.51 2.37 2.42 0.13 0.951 0.049
cee 24 0.90 0.85 0.33 0.50 0.40 0.559 0.441
nic 5 1.92 2.01 1.87 1.92 -0.00 1.002 -0.002
asia 20 1.38 1.16 1.29 1.25 0.13 0.904 0.096
ssa 48 1.22 0.73 1.03 0.93 0.29 0.763 0.237
la 28 1.28 1.26 0.82 0.97 0.31 0.757 0.243
me 12 0.93 0.89 1.04 0.67 0.26 0.722 0.278
na 5 1.34 1.24 1.21 1.22 0.12 0.909 0.091
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Table 5: Growth Variance Decomposition: Plausible Shares, New Human Capital β = .375, ρ = 0
egalitarian capital intensity plausible shares plausible shares
covariance share covariance share new data BDT data
Region N
σgx,gy
σ2gy
σgz,gy
σ2gy
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
σgzˆ,gy
σ2gy
Sgx Sgz Sgx Sgz
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
World 168 0.963 0.037 1.026 -0.026 0.960 0.040 .22 .78
wc 18 0.896 0.104 0.845 0.155 0.871 0.029 .46 .54
se 8 1.135 -0.135 1.201 -0.201 0.883 0.117 .50 .50
cee 24 0.977 0.023 0.966 0.034 0.977 0.023 .28 .72
nic 5 2.028 -1.028 2.535 -1.535 0.556 0.444 .64 .36
asia 20 0.964 0.036 0.946 0.054 0.964 0.036 .40 .60
ssa 48 0.868 0.132 0.802 0.198 0.838 0.162 .37 .63
la 28 0.865 0.135 0.799 0.201 0.834 0.166 .22 .78
me 12 0.962 0.038 1.378 -0.378 0.927 0.073 .44 .56
na 5 0.700 0.300 0.553 0.447 0.676 0.324 .84 .16
larger regions
(1): wc & nic 23 0.983 0.017 0.974 0.026 0.933 0.067
(2): (1) & se 31 1.111 -0.111 1.166 -0.166 0.905 0.095
(3): (2) & na 36 1.096 -0.096 1.144 -0.144 0.918 0.082
(4): (3) & asia 56 1.049 -0.049 1.072 -0.072 0.953 0.047
(5): (4) & la 84 1.022 -0.022 1.033 -0.033 0.963 0.037
(6); (5) & ssa 132 0.946 0.054 0.919 0.081 0.944 0.056
(7): (6) & me no opec 135 0.946 0.054 0.919 0.081 0.944 0.056
(8): (7) & cee 159 0.963 0.037 0.945 0.055 0.958 0.042
5.1 Spillovers
The previous sub-section showed that intergenerational links between parents and children improve our
understanding of growth differences, but at the cost of often times producing greater than 100% explanatory
shares. In this section we examine the role international spillovers can play in explaining cross country
growth differences. We find reasonable values for ρ, which determines how much use a generation gets from
the spillover h. We assume that human capital spillover arises from the maximum human capital country,
which is the US.43 Tamura (1996) showed that conditional convergence from 1960-1985 was captured by the
share of eligible population enrolled in secondary school.44 Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) derive a general
model of diffusion with human capital, that includes both exponential and logistic models as special cases,
and provide empirical evidence of the importance of human capital for diffusion of technology. Similar to
43The US certainly led the world in universal secondary schooling, c.f. Goldin (2001) and Goldin and Katz (2008), and
tertiary schooling. A few countries have measured primary school enrollment rates higher than the US in the first third of the
nineteenth century, e.g. Netherlands, however literacy was quite high in the US from the initial settlement.
44If a country had 15% of its eligible population enrolled in secondary school in 1960, the country converged toward the
US living standard over the next 25 years. Tamura (1996) used a step function approach, beyond a critical exposure rate to
secondary school, children could fully access the spillover human capital. We modify that approach by making the access a
continuous function of schooling exposure, similar to Tamura and Simon (2016), and Tamura, Simon and Murphy (2016).
25
Behabib and Spiegel (2005), we allow the rate of diffusion to depend directly on the level of schooling. As
a country becomes more educated, it can better draw on the body of knowledge in the world:.
ρ = min
{
.35,
S
30
}
,
where S is the schooling of the children. In this specification the lower bound for ρ is 0 (when children
have no schooling) and the upper bound is .35 (when children have 10.5 years of schooling). Thus at the
lower extreme there is no convergence in human capital, unless schooling was identical to 0 across countries,
and all countries converge to the same steady state human capital. At the upper extreme, human capital
converges at a rate of 1.75 (.875) % per year, depending on a generation of 20 (or 40) years. In the upper
bound case, it would take a country 39 (78) years to close the gap by 50 percent. With the data at hand,
this more rapid convergence can be seen by the NIC ’s, as well as China and India recently. For low levels
of schooling, the slow convergence, would just as likely appear to be non convergence.
Again, suppose we compare the US with a country like Eritrea. As an approximation, let’s assume that
ρ = 0 for Eritrea (but schooling is constant at 2.2 years), but is given by the above for the US. These would
produce a stationary human capital for the US and Eritrea of:
h(14.6) = A
1
1−β−.9ρ exp(
1.46
1− β − .9ρ ) (32)
h(2.2) = A
1
1−β exp(
.22
1− β ) (33)
h(14.6)
h(2.2)
= A
.9ρ
(1−β−.9ρ)(1−β) exp(
1.46
1− β − .9ρ −
.22
1− β ) (34)
For a value of young schooling in the US of 14.6, ρ = .35. For β = .375, and an A = .38028169, the
stationary relative income gap between the US and Eritrea would be 16.2, which is almost 40% of the
observed gap of about 45. Recall that without spillovers, the stationary relative human capital gap would
be 7.25, so the introduction of conditional spillovers more than doubles the gap between high education
economies and low education economies. Thus while allowing for convergence for those countries with well
educated young workers, the model also allows for an even greater relative income gap between the richest
countries and the lowest schooling countries.
The results of this new calculation for human capital are presented in Figure 10. We plot the weighted
average human capital by region. As before there is a surprising amount of stationarity in the relative
gap between the Western Countries and the other regions. With spillovers there appears to be more
separation of the regions. As before there are three distinct human capital regimes, high human capital,
middle human capital and low human capital. The membership in these regimes is the same as the model
without spillovers. While the high human capital group is more diffusely spread, the middle human capital
group appears to be clustered the same as before. In Figure 11 we plot the new TFP levels for regions. In
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Figure 10: Human Capital Per Worker, β = .35, ρ > 0: by Region
contrast to the previous TFP graph, there is slower long term trend growth in TFP across regions, and a
more prominent post 1970 TFP decline in every region except Asia.
Table 6 presents the results for growth accounting using the new measure of human capital with
spillovers. Whether weighted or unweighted, between 80% to 85% of real output growth per worker is
captured by input growth.45 This result is similar across regions. From a low of 7.5 percent of growth
explained by TFP growth, North Africa, to a high of one third of growth explained by TFP growth, Sub-
Saharan Africa, we find that the new measure of human capital better captures the growth of output per
worker, than the Mincer model of human capital and equally well as the intergenerational human capital
model without spillovers.
Table 7 contains the variance decomposition of growth rates. Introducing conditional human capital
spillovers has little overall effect on the variance decomposition of growth rates at the world level. While
the base intergenerational human capital model explains 96% of growth variation, the conditional spillover
model explains 95% of the variation of growth rates. This hides the improvement for each region. Table
5 shows that the model without spillovers the range of input shares for covariance share is 70%, North
Africa, and 200%, N.I.C.. The range of input shares for covariance share in Table 7 is much tighter, 92%
45Recall we chose the A parameter in each parameter configuration to hold the share of growth accounted for by input
growth, under the duration-labor force weighted case, constant.
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Figure 11: Total Factor Productivity, β = .35, ρ > 0: by Region
Sub-Saharan Africa and 105% North Africa. With the more restrictive Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare capital
intensity covariance share, without conditional human capital spillovers input shares in three regions are
substantially in excess of 100%, 120% for Southern Europe, 250% for N.I.C. and 138% for Middle East, and
one region has input share of only 55%, North Africa. Of the remaining five regions, two have input shares
greater than 90% and the remaining three have input shares less than 85%. The Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare capital intensity covariance share results for the spillover model show major improvement. Although
the number of regions with input share in excess of 100% remains at three, they are much closer to 100%,
104% for N.I.C., 108% for North Africa and 133% for Middle East. The remaining six regions have a
tighter range for input shares of 88% to 95%.
Examining larger groupings is informative. For the Mincer human capital model over multiple regions,
the plausible input share of growth variations ranged from 40% to 48%. With Intergenerational human
capital accumulation the plausible input share of growth variations ranges from 91% to 96%. Finally with
conditional spillovers, using the plausible input share metric, the model explains between 95% and 97% of
the cross sectional variation in growth rates, no matter the sample. In all large regions in the model with
spillovers produces 92% to 98% input share whether the egalitarian input covariance share or the capital
intensity covariance share metric is used. In contrast the intergenerational human capital accumulation
model without spillovers has egalitarian covariance shares in excess of 100% for all large regions until
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Sub-Saharan Africa is used. This is also true for the capital intensity covariance share. Thus conditional
spillovers help to restrain the intergenerational human capital accumulation model from explaining more
than 100% of the variation in growth rates across regions.
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Table 6: Growth Accounting: New Human Capital β = .375 & .35 ≥ ρ > 0
% Annualized Growth Rates input TFP
Region N gy ghc gx gz share share
Labor Force-Duration Weights
World 168 1.24 0.97 1.04 0.19 0.842 0.158
wc 18 1.42 1.09 1.20 0.22 0.847 0.153
se 8 1.46 1.15 1.31 0.15 0.897 0.103
cee 24 1.37 1.08 1.19 0.18 0.866 0.134
nic 5 1.83 1.45 1.66 0.18 0.903 0.097
asia 20 1.15 0.94 0.99 0.16 0.861 0.139
ssa 48 1.16 0.88 0.77 0.39 0.663 0.337
la 28 1.20 0.73 0.87 0.33 0.722 0.278
me 12 1.16 1.02 0.96 0.20 0.829 0.171
na 5 1.21 1.08 1.12 0.09 0.926 0.074
Labor Force Weights
World 168 1.24 0.98 1.02 0.21 0.827 0.173
wc 18 1.42 1.09 1.21 0.22 0.848 0.152
se 8 1.53 1.19 1.35 0.17 0.887 0.113
cee 24 1.08 0.75 0.88 0.20 0.814 0.186
nic 5 1.84 1.46 1.66 0.18 0.904 0.096
asia 20 1.19 0.98 1.02 0.17 0.856 0.144
ssa 48 1.17 0.94 0.77 0.40 0.658 0.342
la 28 1.20 0.75 0.88 0.33 0.728 0.272
me 12 1.22 1.26 1.03 0.19 0.845 0.155
na 5 1.22 1.11 1.13 0.09 0.927 0.073
Unweighted
World 168 1.32 1.06 1.07 0.25 0.808 0.192
wc 18 1.69 1.30 1.46 0.23 0.864 0.136
se 8 2.54 2.16 2.28 0.27 0.896 0.104
cee 24 0.90 0.62 0.70 0.20 0.777 0.223
nic 5 1.92 1.60 1.74 0.18 0.907 0.093
asia 20 1.38 1.23 1.21 0.17 0.877 0.123
ssa 48 1.22 0.92 0.86 0.37 0.700 0.300
la 28 1.28 0.92 1.04 0.24 0.810 0.190
me 12 0.93 1.17 0.72 0.21 0.777 0.223
na 5 1.34 1.29 1.27 0.07 0.948 0.052
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Table 7: Growth Variance Decomposition: Plausible Bounds, New Human Capital β = .375, .35 ≥ ρ > 0
egalitarian capital intensity plausible shares plausible shares
covariance share covariance share new data BDT data
Region N
σgx,gy
σ2gy
σgz,gy
σ2gy
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
σgzˆ,gy
σ2gy
Sgx Sgz Sgx Sgz
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
World 168 0.950 0.050 0.997 0.003 0.947 0.053 .22 .78
wc 18 0.966 0.034 0.949 0.051 0.963 0.037 .46 .54
se 8 0.959 0.041 0.939 0.061 0.959 0.041 .50 .50
cee 24 0.965 0.035 0.948 0.052 0.936 0.064 .28 .72
nic 5 1.024 -0.024 1.035 -0.035 0.959 0.041 .64 .36
asia 20 0.945 0.055 0.918 0.082 0.936 0.064 .40 .60
ssa 48 0.918 0.082 0.878 0.122 0.901 0.099 .37 .63
la 28 0.935 0.065 0.903 0.097 0.935 0.065 .22 .78
me 12 0.968 0.032 1.333 -0.333 0.952 0.048 .44 .56
na 5 1.054 -0.054 1.080 -0.080 0.920 0.080 .84 .16
larger regions
(1): wc & nic 23 0.981 0.019 0.972 0.028 0.972 0.028
(2): (1) & se 31 0.960 0.040 0.940 0.060 0.960 0.040
(3): (2) & na 36 0.948 0.052 0.923 0.077 0.946 0.054
(4): (3) & asia 56 0.945 0.055 0.918 0.082 0.940 0.060
(5): (4) & la 84 0.952 0.048 0.928 0.072 0.951 0.049
(6); (5) & ssa 132 0.947 0.053 0.921 0.079 0.947 0.053
(7): (6) & me no opec 135 0.947 0.053 0.921 0.079 0.946 0.054
(8): (7) & cee 159 0.948 0.052 0.922 0.078 0.945 0.055
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6 Robustness
In this section we present evidence on the robustness of the results. First we examine a range of other
parameter specifications. Also we use development accounting to assess the ability of variations in log inputs
per worker at explaining measured differences in log output per worker. Second we split the data into two
equal time periods. For each country we found the closest midpoint observation year and then produced
samples with that midyear observation as the terminal and initial value. This evidence is consistent with
the conclusion that the model with intergenerational human capital accumulation with spillovers fits the
data well.
6.1 Development Accounting
We have shown that variations in growth rates are captured mostly by the variations in input growth
rates when inputs include intergenerational human capital accumulation. Does this also hold for variations
in levels of output per worker? Similar to variance decomposition analysis of growth rates, we conduct
a variance decomposition on log levels of output per worker. Our analysis differs from recent work on
development account such as Caselli (2005), and the recent work with human capital accumulation such as
Manuelli and Seshadri (2014) and Erosa, Koreshkova and Restuccia (2010). The major point of departure
is that in these previous works the authors focus on explaining the difference in log output per worker or per
capita at a single point in time.46 Here we have 22 different cross sections on living standards around the
world. With observations in every decade from 1800-2010, it allows us to conduct multiple development
accounting exercises.47 We follow two strategies that complement each other. For each development
accounting variance decomposition we use the same three metrics as in variance decomposition of growth
rates: (1) covariance accounting, (2) covariance accounting with only physical capital intensity, (3) plausible
shares. In the first strategy we construct the shares of the variance of log per worker income explained
by inputs for each decade, and average them over the 22 observations. The second strategy is to pool all
of the observations together in a single sample and perform the development accounting exercises on this
universe of data. These two different strategies produce very similar results. Variations in log per worker
inputs explain between 55% and 70% of the observed log variations in output per worker.48
Once again we can combine the factors of production per worker into the variable x. Assuming a
46See however the seminal work of Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010). In their paper they show the strong correlation
between current income and technology adoption and the level of technology in 1500 AD. Furthermore they show the strong
correlation between 1000 BC and 0 AD, and 0 AD to 1500 AD!
47Easterly (2006) shows that the big push and poverty trap theories are not consistent with the data 1950-2001. He finds
results quite supportive of Parente and Prescott (1994,1999, 2002).
48Thus our results are more favorable towards input explanations of living standard differences than found in Easterly and
Levine (2001). Of course this still leaves quite substantial differences in log TFP across countries. The work of Hsieh &
Klenow (2009) is particularly instructive.
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Cobb-Douglas production function produces the following result:
ln yit = ln zit + lnxit, (35)
lnxit = α ln kit + (1− α) lnhit (36)
As with our variance decomposition of growth rates, we use the two covariance decompositions suggested
by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997). These are versions of Caselli (2005) success 3.49 In the first, we
assume that output variations arise from both input variations and TFP variations:
σ2ln yt = σln xt,ln yt + σln zt,ln yt (37)
In the second, we assume that higher TFP induces input accumulation of physical capital, and hence only
the variations in physical capital intensity and variations in human capital are variations in inputs that
account for variations in output per worker. Thus we have:
σ2ln yt = σln xˆt,ln yt + σln zˆt,ln yt (38)
ln xˆt =
α
1− α [ln kt − ln yt] + lnht (39)
ln zˆt =
α
1− α ln zt (40)
Finally we can use the two different theories of the correlation between factor accumulation and TFP growth
to help assign the correlated component of log levels of inputs and TFP. First under the view that TFP
induces factor accumulation, and that the predictable or correlated portion of inputs should be assigned to
TFP, the share of output per worker can be written as:
1 =
(σln z + σln xρln x,ln z)
2
σ2ln y
+
(1− ρ2ln x,ln z)σ2ln x
σ2ln y
(41)
where the first term is now a plausible upper bound on the proportion of the variation in log output per
worker explained by variation in log TFP. At the other end of the theoretical spectrum, the predictable
or correlated component of TFP arises from endogenous factor accumulation. Assigning this predictable
component to factors produces the following variance decomposition:
1 =
(σln x + σln zρln x,ln z)
2
σ2ln y
+
(1− ρ2ln x,ln z)σ2ln z
σ2ln y
(42)
49Caselli’s first two measures of success are the ratio of the variance of log inputs to the variance of log output, and the ratio
of two 90-10 ratios,
x90/x10
y90/y10
. We focus on version of his success 3 as these are most similar to the variance decomposition
of growth rates. Also since the covariance term is not zero, the ratio of variances is less information. Furthermore if the
correlation of inputs with outputs is weak, the second measure could produce high levels of success even though it mismatches
high input countries with low output, and low input with high output.
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The first term is now the proportion of the variation of output per worker that explained by variation in
inputs. We examine these for the initial conditions as well as the terminal observation.50 Thus the shares
of the variance of log output per worker are given by:
Sln x =
σ2ln x
σ2ln y
+
1
2
ρ2ln x,ln z
(
σ2ln z − σ2ln x
)
σ2ln y
+
σln xσln zρln x,ln z
σ2ln y
(43)
Sln z =
σ2ln z
σ2ln y
+
1
2
ρ2ln x,ln z
(
σ2ln x − σ2ln z
)
σ2ln y
+
σln xσln zρln x,ln z
σ2ln y
(44)
Figures 12 - 14 contain the time series of the share of variations in log output per worker explained by
variations in log inputs per worker. In each graph we present three different cases, the base case with no
intergenerational human capital accumulation (only Mincer human capital), and intergenerational human
capital accumulation, β = .375 with no spillover, ρ = 0, and with spillover .35 ≥ ρ ≥ 0. The thick curves
in each of the three human capital specifications are the results from using all of the 2044 observations in
a single estimation. The thinner curves, in each of the three human capital specifications, are the results
from each decade cross section. We start with the most restrictive assumption that only physical capital
intensity,ky , variations contribute to input explanations of log level output per worker variations. This is
contained in Figure 12.
Both intergenerational human capital models significantly improve on the base Mincer human capital
cross section model. In every cross section they outperform the base Mincer human capital model in
explaining cross sectional output per worker differences. The spillover model has an average capital intensity
covariance share of 49.3%, and the no spillover model has an average capital intensity covariance share of
49.6%.51 However when we use all data for a single capital intensity covariance share, the spillover model
clearly outperforms the no spillover model, 61.0% to 54.6%.52 For the model with spillovers, its lowest
decade value is typically equal to the base Mincer model value for all data, that is 36%.53
Figure 13 contains the results for the standard covariance share decomposition. The time series of all
three human capital models are identical to the previous case, except for level. Under the assumption that
inputs per worker include only physical capital intensity and human capital, all three human capital models
explained on average less than 50 percent of output per worker variations. When inputs include physical
capital and human capital, all three models explain better than 50 percent of log output per worker
differences. Using the 22 repeated cross sections and averaging, the base Mincer human capital model
explains 52.0% of log output per worker differences. Using the 22 repeated cross sections and averaging,
the models with and without spillovers explain 67.6% and 67.4%of log output per worker differences,
50All terminal years are 2010, except for East Germany, which has a terminal observation in 1990.
51The Mincer model has and average capital intensity covariance share 26.9%.
52The Mincer model has capital intensity covariance share of only 36.0% when all 2044 observations are used.
53The model without spillovers is similar, except for two decades, 1930 and 1940 in which the input share falls below the
base Mincer model with all data.
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Figure 12: Covariance Development Accounting (Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare): Base, β = .375, ρ = 0,
β = .375, ρ > 0
respectively.54
Allowing the data to determine how much of the correlated or predictable component of log input
and log TFP to allocate to each other produces the final metric on the importance of input variations.
Figure 14 contains the results for the three human capital specifications, and there are almost no differences
compared with the covariance share results above. Averaging over the 22 cross sections, log input variations
explain 52.1%, 64.4% and 64.1% of the difference in log output per worker for the Mincer model, the no
spillover model and the conditional spillover model, respectively. Using all 2044 observations in a single
sample, log input differences explain 59.1%, 70.5% and 73.8% of log output per worker differences. With
intergenerational human capital accumulation, we find that input variations are capable of explaining at
least half of the observed variation in output per worker. With the standard Mincer human capital model,
the typical share of log level differences in living standards arising from log inputs is less than 50%. Once
one allows the data to help inform about the importance of the association, we find that log input variation
explains between half and as much as three-fourths of the variation in log output per worker.
54When using all 2044 observations in a single sample, the base Mincer model explains 59.2%, the model without spillovers
explains 72.4% and the full spillover model explains 76.7%.
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Figure 13: Covariance Development Accounting: Base, β = .375, ρ = 0, β = .375, ρ > 0
6.2 Alternative Parameter Specifications
In this section we show that the results of the previous sections are robust to different parameter values.
Our conclusion that intergenerational human capital accumulation models with spillovers dramatically help
to explain variation in long run growth rates, as well as variations in living standards is robust. We examine
a range of values on the triple (A, β, ρ) with the restriction that the duration-labor force weighted average
growth rate of output per worker is explained by input growth is 84%, the value in Table 6. For various
combinations of (A, β, ρ) we show that between 80% to 94% of the variation in growth rates of output per
worker is captured by input growth variations. In our preferred specification, (β = .375, .35 ≥ ρ ≥ 0),
94.1% is reached, second only to the 94.5% from (β = .35, .375 ≥ ρ ≥ 0) specification. We also conduct
development accounting exercises, and show that between 55% and 70% of the variation in log levels of
output per worker are explained by variations in inputs per worker, with stronger belief towards the higher
range.
We searched over a wide range of values of β and ρ. For β we examined values from [.025, .70], and for
ρ we examined maximum values from [0, .70] with the constraint β + ρ = .725.55 We combine both the
variance decomposition of growth results and the development accounting results in Table 8.56 The top
55With one exception, the β = .375, ρ = 0 case.
56We think of this exercise as one of quantitative identification. That is the parameters chosen in order to best fit both
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Figure 14: Plausible Shares, Development Accounting: Base, β = .375, ρ = 0, β = .375, ρ > 0
half of Table 8 contains the variance decomposition analyses of growth rates, and the bottom half contains
the variance decomposition analyses of log levels. The results are presented as pairs, columns (1) and (2)
form the first pair, and the remainders are (3) & (4), (5) & (6), (7) & (8). The odd columns contain results
when all countries are in a single group. Thus each contains the variance decompositions of 168 growth rate
histories using the egalitarian covariance assignment (1), the capital intensity covariance assignment (3),
the plausible share from capital intensity (5), and plausible share with both physical and human capital
treated symmetrically (7).57 The even columns present the average results from treating the 9 regions as
separate samples. For example in column (2), we compute the egalitarian covariance share of inputs for
the growth accounting and the variance decomposition of growth rates. This exercise is conducted similar to Tamura and
Simon (2016), Tamura, Simon and Murphy (2016), Murphy, Simon and Tamura (2008) and Tamura (2006). Their models
are forced to fit actual time series, and the forcing variables, such as price of space, or efficiency of schooling time, are allowed
to be whatever they need to be to fit the series. That is given a specific model, what must parameters be in order to fit
the data. In theory we could use a search algorithm for the best fitting parameters that minimizes a loss function. We
leave that to future research. We experimented with other combinations of (A, β, ρ) but the overwhelming majority of those
specifications performed worse than those presented in Table 8 either in the variance decomposition of growth rates or the
variance decomposition of log levels.
57In both the egalitarian covariance share, column (1),
σgx,gy
σ2gy
, and the capital intensity covariance share, column (3),
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
,
it is possible that
σgx,gy
σ2gy
> 1, or
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
> 1 or
σgx,gy
σ2gy
< 0 or
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
< 0. It never is the case
σgx,gy
σ2gy
< 0, nor ever the case
that
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
< 0. It is never the case
σgx,gy
σ2gy
> 1, but often the case that
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
> 1. In those cases we replaced the result to
σ2gy
σgxˆ,gy
.
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each of the 9 regions separately and then average the results.58. Finally column (9) reports the average
of the first eight columns for each parameter specification. Overall measures, (9) shows that input growth
rate variations explain anywhere from 80% to 94% of growth rate variations across countries. Our preferred
specification, (β = .375, .35 ≥ ρ ≥ 0) produces an average explanatory power of 94%, which is the second
highest of the range presented.
In the development accounting portion of Table 8, column (1) presents the covariance share when using
all years of data. Column (2) presents the average covariance share, where we average the decadal cross
sections from 1800 to 2010.59 Columns (3)-(4) repeat the analysis, but restrict the physical capital input
to be variations in physical capital intensity. Column (3) is the covariance share when using all years.
Column (4) presents the average covariance share over the 22 decadal cross sections. The plausible share
from physical capital intensity variations are presented in columns (5)-(6). Column (5) comes from all
years, and column (6) is the average of the 22 cross sections. Columns (7)-(8) present the plausible share
allowing physical capital and human capital to vary. Finally column (9) presents the average across all
eight measures for each parameter specification. Overall measures, (9) shows that log level input differences
explain somewhere between 56% to as much as 70% of the log level variation across countries. Our preferred
specification, (β = .375, .35 ≥ ρ ≥ 0) averages 62% over all development accounting measures, the median
of the distribution of development shares.
The final column, (10), of Table 8 is an arithmetic average of a parameter specification’s growth de-
composition and log evel decomposition input share. In the 17 cases, the average input share ranges from
a low of 73%, (β = .025, .70 ≥ ρ ≥ 0), to a high of 78%, (β = .375, .35 ≥ ρ ≥ 0). Thus we see that inter-
generational human capital accumulation with conditional human capital spillovers can help to explain the
observed variation in growth rates and the observed log level differences in living standards.
6.3 First Half & Second Half
In this section we examine how well the model works for early years and later years. For each country we
found the midpoint year observation, hereafter referred to as midyear, and split the country’s time series
into two parts. We examine how the three models fit the data when comparing the period from the first
year of observation until the midyear, and then from the midyear to 2010. If the human capital calculations
58In both the egalitarian covariance share,
σgx,gy
σ2gy
, and the capital intensity covariance share cases,
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
, it is possible that
σgx,gy
σ2gy
> 1, or
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
> 1 or
σgx,gy
σ2gy
< 0 or
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
< 0. It never is the case
σgx,gy
σ2gy
< 0, nor ever the case that
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
< 0.
However in the event
σgx,gy
σ2gy
> 1, or the event that
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
> 1, we replaced those values with the reciprocal value, i.e. In
those cases we replaced the result to
σ2gy
σgxˆ,gy
, or
σ2gy
σgxˆ,gy
59We defined a country observation in year t is in decade X if X + 4 ≥ t ≥ X − 5. As with the covariance accounting of
growth rates, it is possible that
σln x,ln y
σ2
ln y
> 1 or
σln x,ln y
σ2
ln y
< 0 for any cross section. If the
σln x,ln y
σ2
ln y
> 1 in a cross section, we
replaced it with its inverse,
σ2ln y
σln x,ln y
. If
σln x,ln y
σ2
ln y
< 0 we replaced it with 1− 1/(1− σln x,ln y
σ2
ln y
).
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are robust, then they should fit each of these periods as well as the overall period, absent innovations to
the underlying structure of the economy. There are certainly many alternative ways to decompose the time
periods of each country’s observation. For example for those countries that we have data from 1820, one
could imagine looking at the 19th century and then the remaining years. Or breaking up the 20th century
into pre World War I, Interwar years, and then post World War II. However many countries do not have
data spanning most of the 19th century. Instead of having composition changes across periods, we chose
to keep the samples balanced.
Tables 9 - 12 contain the results of both the growth accounting and the variance decompositions for
the Mincer human capital model (hereafter referred to as base model), and the intergenerational human
capital model both with and without spillovers. Tables 9 and 10 present growth accounting for each period,
and Tables 11 and 12 present the variance decomposition results for the original model. We concentrate on
the results contained in the top third of Tables 9 and 10, those arising from labor force-duration weights.
There is a noticeable acceleration in growth rates between the first half and the second half, tripling from
.59% per year to 1.97% per year. Growth rates accelerate in every region except for Sub-Saharan Africa
and the Middle East. It is all the more remarkable since for all of these regions, except for Sub-Saharan
Africa, the second half of the data include both World Wars, and the Great Depression. The base model
explains between slightly less than 50% (unweighted) and two thirds of growth (each of the two weighted
results) in the first half and between three fifths (the two weighteed results) to almost 95% of growth in the
second half. The intergenerational model of human capital accumulation without spillovers explains two
thirds (unweighted) to more than 100% of the growth in the first half, and between three fifths (weighted
results) to 100% of growth in the second half. With spillovers the intergenerational human capital model
captures between four ninths (unweighted) to 100% of growth in the first half and between 80% (weighted
results) to more than 100% of growth in the second half.
Recall that in the variance decomposition of growth rates, the base model explained 46% of the variance
of growth, see Table 2. When the data is split, the base model explains 34% of growth rate variations in the
first half of the data, and 38% in the second half, (based on using the covariance share and plausible share).
The intergenerational human capital model improves the ability to explain the cross sectional variation
in growth rates. Without spillovers the model explains 55% of the variation in growth rates in the first
half, and 49% in the second half. The model with conditional human capital spillovers explains 53% of the
variation in growth rates in the first half, and 50% in the second half. All of the results, from all models, are
robust to larger regions. While the ability to fit the time series, split into two equal halves, is not as good
as the entire time series for each country, the intergenerational human capital models both outperform the
Mincer model. In general at least 50% of the variation in growth rates is captured by variation in growth
rates of inputs.
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Table 8: Robustness Analysis: Average Input Share
Growth Variance Decomposition Growth &
Model egalitarian capital intensity capital intensity Development
covariance share covariance share plausible share plausible share
(β, ρ)
σgx,gy
σ2gy
σgx,gy
σ2gy
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
Sgx Avg Sgx Sgx Avg Sgx Avg. Average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(.025, .700) .9807 .9106 .9697 .8464 .9142 .8114 .9697 .8527 .9069 .7313
(.075, .650) .9790 .9177 .9706 .8550 .9191 .8204 .9717 .8610 .9118 .7381
(.125, .600) .9766 .9256 .9725 .8648 .9233 .8330 .9725 .8729 .9177 .7455
(.175, .550) .9731 .9341 .9759 .8761 .9266 .8525 .9716 .8917 .9252 .7539
(.225, .500) .9687 .9425 .9806 .8890 .9288 .8782 .9686 .9165 .9341 .7630
(.275, .450) .9632 .9522 .9870 .9045 .9296 .8965 .9630 .9336 .9412 .7714
(.325, .400) .9558 .9573 .9965 .9134 .9289 .9064 .9542 .9421 .9443 .7782
(.350, .375) .9526 .9582 .9993 .9152 .9281 .9116 .9500 .9463 .9452 .7813
(.375, .350) .9503 .9536 .9969 .9086 .9272 .9059 .9471 .9402 .9412 .7819
(.400, .325) .9473 .9474 .9941 .8993 .9255 .8846 .9433 .9194 .9326 .7804
(.450, .275) .9400 .9313 .9872 .8779 .9202 .8396 .9345 .8729 .9129 .7761
(.500, .225) .9304 .9041 .9766 .8420 .9118 .8071 .9235 .8378 .8917 .7716
(.550, .175) .9185 .8718 .9632 .7991 .8995 .7719 .9111 .8019 .8671 .7652
(.600, .125) .9081 .8337 .9520 .7490 .8839 .7394 .9035 .7700 .8425 .7585
(.650, .075) .8997 .7893 .9446 .6918 .8638 .7033 .8990 .7390 .8163 .7509
(.700, .025) .8961 .7404 .9449 .6296 .8388 .6590 .8943 .7087 .7890 .7430
(.375, .000) .9631 .8452 .9749 .7627 .9093 .7851 .9605 .8361 .8794 .7399
Development Variance Decomposition
Model egalitarian capital intensity capital intensity
covariance share covariance share plausible share plausible share
(β, ρ)
σln x,ln y
σ2ln y
σln x,ln y
σ2ln y
σln xˆ,ln y
σ2ln y
σln xˆ,ln y
σ2ln y
Slnx Avg Slnx Slnx Avg Slnx Avg.
(.025, .700) .7021 .6196 .5148 .4128 .5120 .4006 .6885 .5944 .5556
(.075, .650) .7106 .6266 .5272 .4231 .5219 .4098 .6956 .6001 .5644
(.125, .600) .7194 .6336 .5400 .4334 .5321 .4192 .7028 .6061 .5733
(.175, .550) .7285 .6408 .5533 .4440 .5426 .4288 .7100 .6122 .5825
(.225, .500) .7380 .6481 .5670 .4548 .5532 .4385 .7172 .6184 .5919
(.275, .450) .7478 .6557 .5814 .4660 .5642 .4486 .7245 .6251 .6016
(.325, .400) .7579 .6643 .5963 .4788 .5753 .4600 .7319 .6327 .6121
(.350, .375) .7626 .6688 .6033 .4856 .5804 .4661 .7352 .6367 .6173
(.375, .350) .7672 .6737 .6100 .4929 .5853 .4727 .7384 .6412 .6227
(.400, .325) .7715 .6791 .6164 .5009 .5899 .4800 .7414 .6462 .6282
(.450, .275) .7792 .6910 .6277 .5185 .5978 .4958 .7465 .6572 .6392
(.500, .225) .7870 .7051 .6391 .5395 .6056 .5141 .7515 .6703 .6515
(.550, .175) .7940 .7193 .6494 .5606 .6124 .5316 .7557 .6831 .6633
(.600, .125) .8013 .7332 .6599 .5814 .6190 .5476 .7598 .6947 .6746
(.650, .075) .8087 .7473 .6704 .6022 .6249 .5621 .7631 .7051 .6855
(.700, .025) .8174 .7628 .6830 .6253 .6307 .5760 .7660 .7147 .6970
(.375, .000) .7240 .6759 .5456 .4963 .5361 .4745 .7049 .6436 .6001
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Table 9: Growth Accounting First Half: Base & New Human Capital β = .375 & .35 ≥ ρ ≥ 0
% Annualized Growth Rates
Region N gy gk g
base
hc g
ρ=0
hc g
ρ≥0
hc share
base shareρ=0 shareρ≥0
Labor Force-Duration Weights
World 168 0.59 0.81 0.20 1.23 0.60 0.683 1.849 1.135
wc 18 1.11 1.22 0.37 1.33 0.61 0.583 1.164 0.724
se 8 0.75 0.58 0.27 1.34 0.77 0.496 1.450 0.937
cee 24 0.89 1.61 0.27 1.31 0.84 0.797 1.584 1.226
nic 5 0.56 1.12 0.19 1.49 0.93 0.878 2.420 1.756
asia 20 0.15 0.35 0.07 1.22 0.48 1.097 6.320 2.995
ssa 48 1.36 1.14 0.67 1.03 0.39 0.605 0.781 0.468
la 28 0.86 0.65 0.16 0.53 -0.02 0.377 0.666 0.232
me 12 1.63 1.02 0.18 1.24 0.58 0.211 0.639 0.372
na 5 1.03 1.19 0.09 1.39 0.74 0.443 1.285 0.864
Labor Force Weights
World 168 0.74 0.89 0.29 1.13 0.54 0.654 1.402 0.877
wc 18 1.12 1.23 0.37 1.34 0.82 0.579 1.159 0.850
se 8 0.89 0.71 0.30 1.42 0.84 0.487 1.328 0.897
cee 24 0.90 1.87 0.43 0.57 0.32 1.009 1.113 0.928
nic 5 0.56 1.11 0.19 1.50 0.94 0.873 2.439 1.769
asia 20 0.26 0.25 0.14 1.33 0.60 0.548 3.706 1.844
ssa 48 1.43 1.20 0.70 1.06 0.40 0.604 0.770 0.465
la 28 1.07 0.70 0.28 0.53 -0.00 0.389 0.549 0.213
me 12 2.50 1.11 0.32 1.50 0.58 0.150 0.457 0.372
na 5 1.45 1.38 0.19 1.39 0.77 0.403 0.957 0.674
Unweighted
World 168 1.49 1.20 0.55 0.89 0.43 0.491 0.652 0.443
wc 18 1.58 1.59 0.37 1.61 1.15 0.492 1.019 0.820
se 8 2.43 2.16 0.61 2.95 2.20 0.462 1.106 0.898
cee 24 0.72 1.88 0.81 -0.16 -0.10 1.599 0.712 0.766
nic 5 0.59 0.76 0.08 2.00 1.35 0.513 2.688 1.957
asia 20 1.18 1.06 0.34 1.36 0.71 0.489 1.064 0.697
ssa 48 1.72 0.78 0.70 0.62 0.04 0.421 0.390 0.164
la 28 1.65 1.15 0.52 0.67 0.24 0.440 0.500 0.327
me 12 1.71 0.66 0.40 0.69 0.16 0.021 0.221 0.027
na 5 1.90 1.57 0.31 1.47 0.90 0.383 0.791 0.590
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Table 10: Growth Accounting Second Half: Base & New Human Capital β = .375 & .35 ≥ ρ ≥ 0
% Annualized Growth Rates
Region N gy gk g
base
hc g
ρ=0
hc g
ρ≥0
hc share
base shareρ=0 shareρ≥0
Labor Force-Duration Weights
World 168 1.97 1.71 0.82 0.81 1.43 0.565 0.561 0.772
wc 18 1.63 1.58 0.64 0.74 1.30 0.582 0.623 0.852
se 8 2.18 2.65 0.87 0.89 1.48 0.669 0.675 0.856
cee 24 1.87 1.19 1.23 0.57 1.31 0.650 0.414 0.679
nic 5 3.06 3.13 0.96 1.47 1.82 0.547 0.658 0.735
asia 20 2.11 1.78 0.79 0.76 1.41 0.529 0.519 0.727
ssa 48 1.11 0.15 0.88 1.13 1.46 0.580 0.728 0.932
la 28 1.72 1.68 0.91 0.88 1.55 0.678 0.665 0.926
me 12 1.19 1.28 1.00 0.94 1.64 0.866 0.815 1.194
na 5 1.53 1.26 0.89 0.74 1.41 0.661 0.596 0.889
Labor Force Weights
World 168 1.85 1.53 0.86 0.87 1.46 0.581 0.587 0.799
wc 18 1.63 1.59 0.64 0.74 1.30 0.585 0.625 0.855
se 8 2.19 2.63 0.87 0.91 1.49 0.662 0.674 0.852
cee 24 1.28 0.32 1.41 0.58 1.21 0.820 0.382 0.713
nic 5 3.07 3.14 0.97 1.48 1.83 0.548 0.660 0.735
asia 20 2.14 1.84 0.79 0.81 1.44 0.533 0.538 0.736
ssa 48 0.96 -0.23 0.89 1.24 1.56 0.544 0.788 1.013
la 28 1.62 1.65 0.93 0.90 1.56 0.722 0.709 0.986
me 12 0.65 1.38 1.17 1.22 1.98 1.690 1.675 2.378
na 5 1.40 1.17 0.91 0.78 1.45 0.712 0.649 0.970
Unweighted
World 168 1.14 1.09 1.08 1.19 1.68 0.935 0.997 1.279
wc 18 1.80 1.98 0.71 0.88 1.44 0.627 0.689 0.897
se 8 2.52 2.74 0.83 1.74 2.07 0.580 0.822 0.910
cee 24 1.05 -0.20 1.91 0.82 1.35 1.153 0.461 0.794
nic 5 3.16 3.20 1.00 1.75 1.84 0.545 0.705 0.723
asia 20 1.65 1.35 0.89 1.22 1.71 0.632 0.767 0.964
ssa 48 0.72 0.68 0.99 1.44 1.79 1.236 1.655 1.979
la 28 0.88 1.33 0.93 0.96 1.58 1.214 1.232 1.708
me 12 0.14 1.12 1.24 1.38 2.16 6.557 7.018 10.09
na 5 0.76 0.90 1.02 0.97 1.65 1.290 1.241 1.844
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7 Evidence from Micro Literature
Our work produces human capital across countries. How would one get an independent measure of
human capital, separate from the macro approach here? This is answered in the work of Hendricks (2002)
and Schoellman (2012). Both of these works estimate education quality differences between the US and
many countries. We use their estimates of differential education quality to compute Mincer adjusted human
capital for their sample of countries, and in the case of Schoellman, our entire database of countries in 2000
and 2010.
Hendricks typically reports higher 1990 quality schooling in many countries compared with the US.
In order to compare results, we construct an alternative human capital measure using Hendricks quality
measures. Thus we assume that the relative 1990 human capital implied by differential school quality can
be constructed as:
rHendricksi1990 = exp(.1 ∗Qi ∗ education1524i − .1 ∗ education1524US ) (45)
where Qi is the Hendricks (2002) measure of relative school quality of country i compared to the US, and
education1524i is the years of schooling of the youngest worker cohort in country i.
A pre publication version of Schoellman (2012) contained estimates of relative human capital by country,
adjusted for differences in education quality. These were removed from the published version. In personal
correspondence, Schoellman states that useful estimates of human capital can be constructed using the
simple formula lnhit = .2 ∗Educit. Thus our estimates of year t=2000 and t=2010 country i’s Schoellman
human capital relative to the US is given by:
rSchoellmanit = exp(.2 ∗ [education1524it − education1524USt ]) (46)
Using our model with intergenerational human capital accumulation and international human capital
spillovers, we find no country with human capital in excess of the US, nor any country with young worker
human capital in excess of young US worker human capital. For the 73 countries that Hendricks reports
education quality, our constructed relative human capital has a weighted average of .62. For these 73
countries our model relative young human capital has weighted average of .40. We report the values of
1990 relative output per worker, 1990 relative human capital by cohort for all countries with 1990 Hendricks
relative human capital in Table A2.
In 2000 for all countries exclusive of the US, our constructed Schoellman relative young human capital
has a labor force weighted average of .43. Our model relative human capital for the youngest worker cohort
has a labor force weighted average of .39. We report the values of 2000 relative output per worker, 2000
relative human capital by cohort for all countries, as well as our constructed 2000 Schoellman relative
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human capital in Table A2.
Finally we constructed the predicted Schoellman relative human capital for 2010. Using the same
method as for 2000, this measure has a labor force weighted average of .48. Our model relative human
capital for the youngest worker cohort has a corresponding labor force weighted average of .43.
Table 13 presents regression results comparing our model relative human capital and those from Hen-
dricks (2002) and Schoellman (2012). The Table is broken into four panels. In the northwest panel, labeled
Hendricks, we present results of the regression of young relative human capital from our Hendricks inspired
computation against the model relative human capital.60 The first two columns contain the log-log speci-
fication, and the second two columns report the levels regressions. For each specification we run with and
without regional dummies. The northeast panel repeats the exercise, but for our 2000 Schoellman relative
young human capital specification. The southwest panel reports the results from our 2010 Schoellman
specification. Finally the southeast panel pools all three years together. In all the years, 1990, 2000, 2010
and pooled, our model relative human capital is strongly positively correlated with the Hendricks and
Schoellman relative human capital. This is true whether we control for regions or not, or in levels or logs.
8 Conclusion
The paper presents a simple model of human capital accumulation and physical capital accumulation
within the framework of a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function. We use the new data
created here to estimate new values of country specific human capital. Using a method standard in the
labor literature we allow for Mincerian age-earnings relationships to hold within each country, but allow
for human capital to accumulate across generations. This accumulation technology is similar to Bils
and Klenow (2000), Lucas (1988), Tamura (1991,2002,2006), and Galor (2005). We allow human capital
to build on the shoulders of the previous generation. We find that an intergenerational human capital
accumulation model with conditional spillovers can explain about 85 percent of the long term growth of
output per worker, and 95 percent of the cross sectional variation in output per worker growth. The results
of the development accounting show that this human capital model is capable of explaining about 62% of
the differences in log output per worker. These results are robust to different parameter specifications and
different time periods.
The plausibility of the estimates can be determined by examining other predictions that can be made
with the data. Our construction produces a distribution of human capital for every country. Theories that
consider the inequality of human capital (usually without an age distribution) and their effects on growth
can be tested with our measures of the distribution of human capital, for example Banerjee and Newman
(1993), Barro (2000), Chen (2003), Benabou (1996a,b), Benhabib and Spiegal (1994), Galor and Tsiddon
60We do this with and without population weights. The results do not vary much with population weights, so we only
report the unweighted regressions.
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(1997), Persson and Tabelllini (1994), etc. Additionally we can combine our data with that contained in
Tamura (2006), to examine the connection between mortality risk and human capital accumulation. Finally
the data augmented with fertility provides an ability to test long run growth theories of Galor (2005) and
his coauthors, Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2004), Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009).
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Table 13: Regressions with Model Relative Human Capital: β = .375,.35 ≥ ρ > 0
Hendricks Schoellman
Variable ln(H) ln(H) H H ln(H) ln(H) H H
ln(rel. hc) 0.6588*** 0.4873*** 0.8144*** 0.6837***
(.0431) (.0490) (.0274) (.0355)
rel. hc 1.2686*** 0.9298*** 0.9549*** 0.7740***
(.0757) (.1275) (.0344) (.0542)
constant .1804*** .1750 .1354*** .3826*** -.0472 -.1468 .0709*** .1537***
(.0449) (.1417) (.0377) (.1087) (.0362) (.0935) (.0149) (.0378)
N 73 73 73 73 166 166 166 166
R2 .7672 .9048 .7982 .8947 .8439 .8999 .8247 .8934
region
dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes
Predicted 2010 Schoellman Pooled Regression
ln(H) ln(H) H H ln(H) ln(H) H H
ln(rel. hc) 0.7648*** 0.5903*** 0.8039*** 0.6268***
(.0290) (.0385) (.0209) (.0292)
rel. hc 1.0318*** 0.9225*** 1.0799*** 0.8180***
(.0382) (.0673) (.0301) (.0546)
constant -.0092 -.0489 .0790*** .2003*** .0451* -.0705 .0738*** .2093***
(.0354) (.0959) (.0179) (.0481) (.0258) (.0767) (.0139) (.0402)
N 166 166 166 166 405 405 405 405
R2 .8097 .8749 .8165 .8702 .7864 .8385 .7611 .8075
region
dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes
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9 Appendix
Appendix Table A1 shows that the data has greatly expanded in depth of coverage relative to BDT. We
list each country by geographic region, as in BDT. We also list the first year of observation for each country
and the final year of information in this data set.61 For all countries, our average initial year of observation
is 1900. Thus we observe the average country for 110 years. We observe 18 countries starting no later than
1801. We observe an additional 40 countries starting in year 1820. Therefore we observe 58 countries for
at least 190 years. These 58 countries represent a 2010 population of 5.2 billion out of a world population
of 6.8 billion, and 2.5 billion workers out of 3.1 billion total workers.62
For region 1, Western Countries, the average initial year of observation is 1827, and thus we observe
these 18 countries for over 180 years. In region 2, Southern Europe, the initial year of observation is 1865,
and we now have data for these 8 countries for over 140 years.63 We observe an initial year of 1934 for region
3, Central and Eastern Europe. Central and Eastern Europe is predominated by former Soviet republics,
now independent. In BDT the initial year of observation was 1990. Now for all of these countries we
observe them starting in 1970. Furthermore for the countries that were never Soviet republics, we have an
average initial observation year of 1872.64 Four of 5 countries among the Newly Industrialized Countries,
region 4, have an initial year of observation of 1820. Japan is observed in 1800. Our new initial year of
observation in Asia, region 5, is 1880. Some of this extension arises from the additional countries added to
the sample, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Mongolia, North Korea. However the bulk of the extension arises from
the additional years found for previously observed countries. We were able to start observations in 1820 for
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and
Vietnam. Thus for the overwhelming bulk of Asian population, we have complete data for 190 years. For
region 6, Sub-Saharan Africa, our average initial year of observation is 1946. Hence even for the continent
with the youngest independent countries, we now observe the typical Sub-Saharan African country for more
than 6 decades. The new initial year of observation in Latin America is 1888. Here we added 5 additional
countries, Bahamas (1950), Barbados (1950), Belize (1950), Cuba (1800), and Suriname (1950). We now
observe the largest Latin American countries in 1800: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico,
Uruguay and Venezuela. The Middle East has an average starting year of 1896.65 Five of the dozen Middle
61For all countries, except for the defunct East Germany, we now observe them in 2010, instead of 20. Thus each country
has at least 10 years of additional coverage.
62Three of the countries not observed early, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Pakistan constitute almost 500 million population and
175 million workers in 2010. We observe 67 countries before 1900. These 67 countries represent a 2010 population and labor
force of 5.3 billion and 2.5 billion, respectively.
63We moved Israel into the Southern Europe region as it is most similar to these countries than their Middle East region
neighbors. Without Israel, the average initial year of observation is 1853, and hence we observe the average country for over
150 years.
64We excluded the Slovak Republic since it is not observed separately from the Czech Republic until 1990.
65Of all the regions, the Middle East is potentially most problematic. This has to do with using modern PPP international
dollars to value past output. Most of the oil producing countries of this region in fact were oil producers as early as 1950, as
can be seen in Tsui (2011). However the real price of oil in 1950 was very different from today. We often times separate out
the oil producers in the Middle East from the rest of the Middle East in the empirical work.
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East countries have initial observation year of 1820: Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Finally we
observe four of five North Africa countries starting in 1820.66 The average initial observation year is 1846.
Table A1: First and Last Observations: By Region
Country 1st yr h1st yr15−24 h
1st yr k1st yr y1st yr hlast yr15−24 h
last yr klast yr ylast yr
Western Countries
Australia 1820 0.32 0.27 4456 1354 5.37 5.88 261,002 59,214
Austria 1820 0.57 0.56 7189 2591 5.14 5.06 234,118 58,057
Belgium 1820 0.70 0.68 9538 3300 5.35 5.91 259,690 65,567
Canada 1820 0.80 0.79 9535 3464 5.86 6.66 226,350 56,696
Denmark 1820 0.99 0.97 6568 2420 6.00 6.45 235,164 55,350
Finland 1820 0.75 0.73 3640 1297 5.52 5.94 226,972 57,579
France 1800 0.48 0.46 18,555 2651 4.99 5.17 288,657 57,572
Germany 1800 0.80 0.78 9020 3236 5.40 5.62 203,625 49,552
Iceland 1950 2.70 2.64 50,119 14,604 5.65 6.56 214,001 48,692
Ireland 1820 0.50 0.49 6505 2418 5.19 5.95 198,530 57,771
Luxembourg 1950 1.25 0.77 73,639 21,221 4.44 4.66 413,880 136,997
Netherlands 1800 0.60 0.85 18,672 6142 5.54 6.55 204,859 56,667
New Zealand 1820 0.32 0.31 2956 1027 6.00 6.35 152,859 44,864
Norway 1820 0.45 0.44 6505 2288 5.55 6.00 248,808 63,871
Sweden 1800 0.50 0.49 6979 2368 5.40 5.90 181,230 59,645
Switzerland 1820 0.65 0.63 8532 2720 5.15 5.45 237,632 55,655
United Kingdom 1801 0.80 0.79 30,978 4589 5.70 6.12 262,708 58,637
United States 1790 1.00 0.77 15,287 3474 6.56 8.38 325,533 76,578
Southern Europe
Cyprus 1950 0.12 0.10 5679 1735 2.92 2.54 110,274 43,425
Greece 1820 0.44 0.43 5474 1953 5.10 5.09 147,022 39,066
Israel 1948 2.50 1.33 32,909 8695 4.00 3.72 171,860 59,695
Italy 1820 0.62 0.60 6974 2521 5.24 5.12 336,118 55,294
Malta 1960 0.60 0.38 14,831 4144 4.09 3.76 138,778 45,757
Portugal 1800 0.62 0.60 8499 3059 4.59 4.20 166,120 35,137
Spain 1800 0.62 0.60 7728 2531 5.04 4.93 180,819 41,018
Continued on Next Page
66The lone exception is Libya, which we observe starting in 1950.
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Country 1st yr h1st yr15−24 h
1st yr k1st yr y1st yr hlast yr15−24 h
last yr klast yr ylast yr
Turkey 1820 0.28 0.27 6266 2044 3.42 3.15 80,772 28,569
Central & Eastern Europe
Albania 1870 0.24 0.24 2899 1115 2.33 1.55 42,546 14,592
Armenia 1970 1.10 1.10 55,176 18,569 2.63 1.72 65,403 30,033
Azerbaijan 1970 0.75 0.96 48,484 12,286 3.27 2.05 37,549 21,144
Belarus 1970 0.75 0.98 33,618 13,398 3.71 2.29 76,933 35,344
Bulgaria 1870 0.29 0.29 7055 2280 3.53 2.47 63,883 24,017
Czech Republic 1820 0.44 0.44 6222 2175 3.40 2.46 125,712 32,216
East Germany 1950 1.11 1.24 18,333 8892 1.33 0.77 87,446 12,113
Estonia 1970 2.05 1.89 74,078 21,831 4.07 3.32 170,259 46,639
Georgia 1970 2.50 3.21 61,494 16,487 3.75 2.83 61,925 16,466
Hungary 1869 0.70 0.69 2367 2887 3.37 2.56 81,270 23,962
Kazakhstan 1970 1.75 2.23 75,474 19,585 3.77 2.69 92,659 26,608
Kyrgyzstan 1970 2.50 3.13 31,179 10,636 3.22 2.76 16,578 8002
Latvia 1970 2.05 2.70 56,132 19,552 4.02 3.29 95,369 28,900
Lithuania 1970 2.05 2.67 53,883 19,309 4.05 3.40 76,722 27,638
Moldova 1970 3.00 3.84 34,977 14,885 1.37 2.09 43,049 11,139
Poland 1870 0.28 0.27 5420 2030 3.38 2.65 72,234 27,991
Romania 1870 0.47 0.47 6158 2181 3.17 2.14 48,895 12,072
Russia 1820 0.32 0.32 3660 1190 3.84 3.32 58,391 20,021
Slovak Republic 1990 1.98 1.19 60,795 19,389 3.08 1.90 91,107 30,654
Tajikistan 1970 3.00 3.59 41,653 13,829 1.41 2.25 6801 5508
Turkmenistan 1970 2.75 3.44 63,235 15,897 3.51 2.74 50,812 13,932
Ukraine 1970 2.75 3.57 39,152 13,280 4.05 2.66 40,359 11,821
Uzbekistan 1970 1.75 2.12 50,932 16,704 3.28 2.14 35,637 17,795
Yugoslavia 1910 0.20 0.20 10,168 2553 1.83 1.00 100,183 21,280
Newly Industrialized Countries
Hong Kong 1820 0.20 0.19 5291 1646 4.39 4.57 286,154 72,705
Japan 1800 0.60 0.41 4392 1452 5.38 6.55 359,333 57,393
Singapore 1820 0.20 0.19 5730 1656 4.31 4.54 214,515 66,264
South Korea 1820 0.20 0.17 3841 1279 4.82 4.56 221,489 57,910
Continued on Next Page
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Country 1st yr h1st yr15−24 h
1st yr k1st yr y1st yr hlast yr15−24 h
last yr klast yr ylast yr
Taiwan 1820 0.20 0.20 4930 1654 4.46 4.34 159,576 59,732
Asia
Afghanistan 1950 0.51 0.51 6878 2124 0.99 0.87 11,563 3856
Bangladesh 1950 0.35 0.37 4060 1140 1.11 1.09 7604 3320
Bhutan 1980 0.20 0.20 6928 1640 0.77 0.55 23,411 5186
Cambodia 1950 0.20 0.19 4032 1173 1.47 1.36 8073 5588
China 1820 0.44 0.44 5106 1723 2.73 2.54 50,824 16,897
Fiji 1950 2.00 2.00 31,370 10,224 2.64 2.65 56,967 16,891
India 1820 0.44 0.44 3353 1367 2.56 2.45 26,803 10,725
Indonesia 1820 0.46 0.56 5549 1832 3.14 2.87 27,348 12,197
Laos 1950 0.50 0.47 5764 1622 1.34 1.27 12,905 4586
Malaysia 1820 0.35 0.35 5996 1944 3.44 3.31 99,643 30,283
Mongolia 1950 1.00 1.96 4407 1104 3.39 3.19 18,113 2981
Myanmar 1820 0.20 0.20 4643 1381 2.05 1.94 7458 10,003
Nepal 1820 0.44 0.61 2841 986 1.81 1.70 7344 2680
North Korea 1820 0.30 0.55 2616 911 2.83 3.35 2585 2461
Pakistan 1950 0.35 0.36 9670 2796 0.85 0.85 18,012 8488
Papua New Guinea 1960 0.80 0.80 9050 2910 0.90 1.12 14,297 4874
Philippines 1820 0.82 1.27 5816 1863 4.17 4.53 26,405 9298
Sri Lanka 1820 0.44 0.61 6581 2075 3.86 4.04 43,970 16,390
Thailand 1820 0.44 0.44 3671 1205 3.46 3.30 67,927 19,497
Vietnam 1820 0.44 0.44 3276 1014 2.69 2.32 15,490 6821
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola 1950 0.33 0.33 8907 2500 0.70 0.74 7989 5407
Benin 1950 0.71 0.71 9739 2740 1.33 1.13 9712 4568
Botswana 1950 0.24 0.24 2797 815 2.26 1.93 55,073 11,533
Burkina Faso 1950 0.29 0.29 4519 1368 0.65 0.58 7520 3207
Burundi 1950 0.79 0.78 3247 966 0.91 0.85 2530 1224
Cameroon 1950 0.99 0.98 5777 1633 1.69 1.70 8615 3682
Cape Verde 1950 0.66 0.65 5946 1582 1.74 1.55 35,089 6816
Cent. Afr. Rep. 1950 0.63 1.09 5083 1588 0.85 0.91 2725 1541
Chad 1950 0.55 0.55 6041 1681 0.83 0.77 4295 2416
Continued on Next Page
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Country 1st yr h1st yr15−24 h
1st yr k1st yr y1st yr hlast yr15−24 h
last yr klast yr ylast yr
Comoros 1950 0.51 0.89 5792 1593 1.23 1.07 8169 2753
Congo 1950 0.72 1.19 10,681 2982 1.91 2.16 15,647 6923
Djibouti 1950 0.32 0.31 24,499 6458 0.64 0.63 8610 4979
Equatorial Guinea 1950 0.04 0.04 3202 1223 1.29 1.14 101,881 47,832
Eritrea 1990 0.32 0.42 4960 1649 0.52 0.50 3175 1707
Ethiopia 1950 0.28 0.28 2891 887 0.78 0.67 4778 2435
Gabon 1950 0.90 1.67 38,629 12,508 2.12 2.03 67,862 12,663
Gambia 1950 0.47 0.47 5365 1432 1.16 0.93 6925 3219
Ghana 1870 0.79 0.74 3174 1092 1.74 1.66 13,822 5772
Guinea 1950 0.53 0.53 3534 1054 0.96 0.80 5448 1957
Guinea-Bissau 1950 0.50 0.50 2593 802 1.00 0.87 6092 2033
Ivory Coast 1950 0.81 0.81 4216 2764 1.06 1.06 8216 4286
Kenya 1950 0.85 1.32 7631 1286 2.52 2.42 10,155 3844
Lesotho 1950 0.64 0.64 3261 978 1.91 1.96 27,907 5522
Liberia 1950 0.77 1.31 8813 2740 1.28 1.05 8292 3115
Madagascar 1950 0.90 1.31 8726 2419 1.17 1.27 4605 1713
Malawi 1950 0.76 0.76 2544 756 1.44 1.26 5795 1884
Mali 1950 0.37 0.37 5123 1551 0.80 0.66 9111 3782
Mauritania 1950 0.54 0.53 6280 1963 0.98 0.82 15,990 4472
Mauritius 1950 0.76 0.76 36,571 8898 2.67 2.60 136,162 40,366
Mozambique 1950 0.36 0.36 4491 2307 0.82 0.77 15,113 6871
Namibia 1950 0.98 1.62 22,898 7571 2.21 2.09 55,041 13,990
Niger 1950 0.32 0.51 4832 1425 0.57 0.55 4106 1950
Nigeria 1950 0.29 0.29 8137 2384 1.09 1.02 12,912 7686
Reunion 1950 0.80 1.47 18,157 4790 3.01 2.88 35,020 12,175
Rwanda 1950 0.75 0.74 4882 1405 1.78 1.56 5244 2749
Senegal 1950 0.50 0.87 6147 3165 0.97 0.89 12,912 4415
Seychelles 1950 0.69 1.57 21,869 5538 3.03 3.27 77,157 15,771
Sierra Leone 1950 0.65 1.11 5956 1833 1.52 1.18 3775 2284
Somalia 1950 0.52 0.83 14,046 4222 0.53 0.57 10,692 3912
South Africa 1800 0.75 0.74 5356 1956 2.65 2.35 55,315 17,235
Sudan 1950 0.15 0.15 7675 2309 0.81 0.72 18,406 12,126
Continued on Next Page
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Country 1st yr h1st yr15−24 h
1st yr k1st yr y1st yr hlast yr15−24 h
last yr klast yr ylast yr
Swaziland 1950 0.71 0.70 7427 2421 2.23 2.13 33,275 11,334
Tanzania 1950 0.65 0.65 3317 948 1.13 1.06 5650 2008
Togo 1950 0.95 1.54 4837 1472 1.65 1.63 5051 1642
Uganda 1950 0.54 0.54 5504 1687 1.30 1.13 5106 3506
Zaire 1950 0.90 1.42 4848 1504 0.20 0.68 1420 834
Zambia 1950 0.95 1.63 9449 1770 1.89 1.85 8598 2445
Zimbabwe 1950 0.87 1.38 8805 2009 1.65 1.61 3457 1859
Latin America
Argentina 1800 0.45 0.44 6499 2085 3.69 3.17 83,773 28,772
Bahamas 1950 2.20 3.49 135,809 33,805 3.10 3.36 147,904 30,983
Barbados 1950 0.90 0.90 19,066 5473 3.62 3.11 94,966 27,281
Belize 1950 1.80 1.76 19,734 6356 2.79 2.79 49,441 13,311
Bolivia 1880 0.50 0.65 6289 1884 2.57 2.16 13,720 9011
Brazil 1800 0.60 0.65 4044 1287 2.65 2.35 47,718 16,534
Chile 1800 0.45 0.44 7002 2365 3.51 3.16 104,333 34,527
Colombia 1800 0.42 0.42 5578 1834 2.25 1.95 46,406 18,465
Costa Rica 1920 0.80 0.79 20,609 5789 2.52 2.38 57,094 20,839
Cuba 1800 0.42 0.43 3354 1002 2.94 2.54 4626 10,448
Dominican Republic 1950 0.60 0.59 11,334 3362 2.53 2.29 36,775 15,174
Ecuador 1870 0.31 0.30 3932 1287 2.70 2.45 47,638 13,774
El Salvador 1920 1.45 1.42 11,271 3129 2.69 2.48 25,534 8860
Guatemala 1921 0.70 0.72 16,087 4528 1.68 1.49 37,213 14,490
Guyana 1946 1.45 1.54 14,926 3905 2.80 2.77 51,936 10,655
Haiti 1940 0.95 1.76 5733 2191 1.25 1.23 5594 2077
Honduras 1920 1.00 1.74 14,220 4314 1.85 1.77 27,696 7725
Jamaica 1820 0.70 0.82 6455 2177 2.87 2.73 64,875 10,162
Mexico 1800 0.55 0.54 6611 2104 2.63 2.36 78,702 22,355
Nicaragua 1920 1.15 2.47 15,520 4257 2.03 1.98 23,398 5248
Panama 1940 1.35 1.32 22,415 7089 2.99 2.90 57,206 19,234
Paraguay 1939 1.70 1.67 20,435 7065 2.29 2.31 27,555 9450
Peru 1870 0.70 0.79 8266 2723 2.84 2.57 38,584 14,301
Puerto Rico 1950 0.86 0.84 31,078 8654 3.56 3.40 165,087 48,022
Continued on Next Page
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Country 1st yr h1st yr15−24 h
1st yr k1st yr y1st yr hlast yr15−24 h
last yr klast yr ylast yr
Suriname 1950 0.86 0.86 20,039 6943 2.59 2.41 97,352 19,880
Trinidad 1946 0.80 0.78 25,704 10,455 3.01 2.85 134,469 47,143
Uruguay 1800 0.45 0.44 8028 3224 3.38 2.71 81,832 29,139
Venezuela 1800 0.40 0.36 3629 1371 2.58 2.26 58,506 27,339
Middle East
Bahrain 1950 0.80 2.18 27,714 8054 3.28 2.94 39,332 10,535
Iran 1820 0.34 0.28 7537 2439 2.15 1.85 59,439 24,091
Iraq 1820 0.70 1.09 6030 2509 1.96 1.89 23,437 8720
Jordan 1820 0.51 0.51 8659 3704 2.12 1.93 100,567 26,618
Kuwait 1950 0.67 0.66 212,210 65,168 2.06 2.02 94,132 39,995
Lebanon 1820 0.75 0.89 8074 2458 3.01 2.70 66,308 16,643
Oman 1950 0.32 0.21 5987 2140 1.63 1.35 122,983 29,311
Qatar 1950 1.25 1.59 228,433 79,530 0.91 0.64 50,503 20,234
Saudi Arabia 1950 0.80 0.58 28,237 9994 2.04 1.69 127,437 35,889
Syria 1820 0.35 0.34 7835 2688 2.48 2.26 96,074 37,453
UAE 1950 0.67 0.65 109,630 37,233 2.63 2.37 52,736 28,279
Yemen 1950 0.40 0.29 10,311 3263 1.65 1.38 37,668 14,118
North Africa
Algeria 1820 0.32 0.28 3548 1225 2.55 2.09 69,369 13,914
Egypt 1820 0.32 0.18 5472 1796 2.65 2.22 29,754 15,449
Libya 1950 0.71 0.73 10,934 3683 2.78 2.45 18,707 10,303
Morocco 1820 0.32 0.18 3906 1406 1.34 1.24 58,047 14,362
Tunisia 1820 0.32 0.19 5243 1705 2.47 2.12 78,959 22,276
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Table A2: Relative Output per Worker, Human Capital, and School Quality Measures
Country ry1990 Hendricks r
15−24
1990 r
25−34
1990 r
35−44
1990 r
y
2000 Schoellman r
15−24
2000 r
25−34
2000 r
35−44
2000
Australia 73.1 123.9 76.7 71.1 62.4 75.5 82.0 77.4 72.3 67.9
Austria 80.7 121.4 67.4 56.5 46.5 78.8 86.3 73.9 65.3 53.8
Belgium 95.3 116.1 75.9 73.6 61.2 86.1 77.1 79.4 73.4 71.6
Canada 75.2 156.2 86.8 76.0 65.2 77.8 92.7 94.8 86.5 74.1
Denmark 72.3 136.0 82.4 76.5 65.5 76.2 98.8 84.1 81.5 75.0
Finland 70.6 76.1 69.8 60.5 70.3 89.2 81.1 74.4 67.9
France 87.6 117.4 69.6 61.7 50.4 81.1 73.0 73.0 64.9 58.9
Germany 72.6 116.1 73.2 65.5 49.3 69.2 87.7 79.2 72.1 63.8
Iceland* 77.2 81.6 84.2 72.8 65.7 82.9 81.1 79.2 82.2
Ireland 68.0 100.6 76.4 70.7 62.7 81.9 70.5 77.3 74.1 68.2
Luxembourg* 122.1 64.4 54.6 43.3 159.0 52.9 65.1 61.7 51.4
Netherlands 82.6 98.3 83.4 80.4 72.9 77.1 77.3 84.4 81.7 78.9
New Zealand 59.0 120.9 80.5 76.9 71.0 58.8 101.6 81.5 75.9 73.9
Norway 78.5 128.1 76.1 74.9 62.3 83.7 87.5 81.3 73.8 72.9
Sweden 72.7 113.4 75.1 74.5 61.4 73.6 79.7 77.8 72.8 72.9
Switzerland 86.4 122.1 70.1 65.5 56.3 73.4 77.8 76.5 67.0 62.5
United Kingdom 71.4 114.4 78.5 74.8 67.5 76.3 92.3 78.9 75.9 72.8
average 76.8 120.3 75.9 69.6 58.3 75.6 85.1 79.8 73.6 67.5
Cyprus 34.3 31.6 26.3 17.0 47.5 48.1 37.0 29.6 25.0
Greece 52.4 81.8 67.4 61.9 49.0 47.3 79.6 72.1 64.4 59.1
Israel 85.3 88.4 58.0 41.9 39.9 75.9 66.9 58.2 44.0 40.6
Italy 87.1 97.3 67.0 62.4 48.1 83.2 87.3 71.4 64.3 60.0
Malta* 47.3 50.0 38.8 27.0 55.1 56.4 58.2 47.5 36.7
Portugal 50.4 74.4 55.5 49.4 39.9 49.7 70.6 61.4 52.1 46.8
Spain 65.1 93.0 68.4 56.2 41.0 61.4 78.9 72.3 66.9 53.3
Turkey 33.7 62.2 40.8 35.4 25.8 35.5 37.3 47.3 37.2 32.8
average 62.4 83.7 58.9 52.0 39.5 59.4 68.6 63.5 55.6 48.9
Albania* 13.0 21.4 9.7 4.8 14.1 49.3 18.6 14.2 4.3
Armenia* 27.2 37.6 26.0 10.5 19.1 40.0 32.7 24.8 9.4
Azerbaijan 24.0 45.2 31.1 7.5 10.0 56.5 39.3 29.9 6.7
Belarus 30.8 37.6 28.0 7.3 25.1 78.7 32.7 24.8 6.5
Bulgaria 26.8 42.5 28.2 11.9 18.0 60.4 37.0 28.1 10.6
Czech Republic 39.3 76.1 40.4 23.3 14.0 31.8 59.4 35.2 26.7 12.5
East Germany 21.5 27.1 14.6 8.6
Estonia* 46.1 54.8 33.7 19.9 49.9 78.2 47.7 36.2 17.7
Georgia 37.1 68.3 47.3 25.0 13.8 58.2 59.4 45.1 22.3
Hungary 32.7 69.8 40.8 25.7 14.4 29.3 54.7 43.1 27.0 12.8
Kazakhstan* 34.7 58.4 37.2 17.0 22.0 65.3 50.8 38.6 15.1
Kyrgyzstan* 19.6 61.5 39.9 24.0 8.8 44.1 53.5 40.6 21.4
Latvia 41.0 51.6 40.0 20.0 30.8 69.1 44.9 34.1 17.8
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Country ry1990 Hendricks r
15−24
1990 r
25−34
1990 r
35−44
1990 r
y
2000 Schoellman r
15−24
2000 r
25−34
2000 r
35−44
2000
Lithuania 37.4 54.5 41.5 20.2 27.1 67.4 47.4 36.0 18.0
Moldova* 35.5 56.2 40.3 27.9 8.1 51.9 48.9 37.1 31.3
Poland 24.4 70.4 38.6 22.5 10.9 29.5 62.2 44.8 25.5 17.4
Romania 17.3 65.6 36.5 21.8 9.9 11.3 51.5 31.8 24.1 8.8
Russia 30.2 79.8 47.9 26.9 14.1 18.9 79.2 58.7 31.6 20.8
Slovak Republic 34.4 40.6 23.4 14.1 30.6 58.4 35.3 26.8 12.5
Tajikistan* 18.1 60.5 45.3 28.7 4.5 54.0 26.3 40.0 35.1
Turkmenistan* 23.2 67.5 42.0 26.0 11.2 54.8 58.7 44.6 23.2
Ukraine 27.3 59.8 45.1 27.0 10.7 70.5 52.0 39.5 24.0
Uzbekistan 27.3 50.2 37.2 17.0 16.5 50.9 43.7 33.2 15.1
Yugoslavia 34.3 62.1 21.7 11.4 5.1 17.5 29.8 18.9 14.3 4.6
average 29.6 77.1 44.9 25.5 13.3 18.8 67.2 48.8 31.3 17.9
Hong Kong 76.9 72.9 58.5 46.9 36.6 82.3 60.0 63.2 55.4 43.9
Japan 83.9 125.4 81.4 82.6 69.1 74.0 69.0 81.3 79.3 81.5
Singapore 55.1 55.8 47.6 38.5 77.9 57.1 60.6 52.6 45.0
South Korea 43.5 61.0 58.2 45.7 34.9 59.5 86.7 64.7 55.3 43.3
Taiwan 53.3 65.8 54.5 48.6 37.8 66.7 65.5 60.0 51.0 45.8
average 72.5 105.0 73.4 70.7 58.1 70.5 71.9 74.6 70.0 67.7
Afghanistan 3.7 10.4 11.6 9.5 2.9 13.4 10.8 10.3 9.9
Bangladesh 3.4 35.9 13.8 13.3 11.4 3.3 17.6 14.7 13.8 11.5
Bhutan* 5.8 5.8 4.6 2.9 6.6 17.0 7.6 5.6 3.8
Cambodia 4.1 18.0 12.0 9.0 4.4 25.6 20.8 16.7 10.3
China 8.2 48.6 31.8 20.6 12.6 10.6 45.6 32.1 24.5 23.8
Fiji 30.4 50.3 36.8 34.2 31.3 29.1 37.7 38.7 31.4 31.4
India 7.6 51.0 34.1 27.5 22.1 8.5 27.2 37.4 30.6 24.7
Indonesia 13.2 55.5 38.8 28.8 21.9 13.4 34.2 42.6 35.4 25.7
Laos 4.6 17.0 14.9 10.4 4.6 22.6 18.3 15.9 12.9
Malaysia 28.6 57.8 42.6 33.1 28.1 33.7 39.0 49.3 38.6 30.0
Mongolia* 8.6 44.5 36.8 30.0 4.8 54.2 49.7 35.3 35.3
Myanmar 3.8 26.5 22.1 18.0 4.9 20.9 29.6 23.6 19.5
Nepal 3.3 24.4 16.6 13.5 3.4 21.0 27.7 21.2 14.1
North Korea* 10.7 47.5 42.6 37.7 3.7 26.6 46.4 44.0 39.9
Pakistan 13.5 33.0 11.1 11.7 9.2 11.0 13.9 11.3 10.6 10.1
Papua New Guinea* 7.5 17.5 18.2 14.6 6.9 13.7 15.1 17.0 16.0
Philippines 12.8 55.0 61.1 48.6 39.4 10.7 46.5 62.6 58.1 46.0
Sri Lanka 14.3 63.6 54.0 49.0 39.0 16.0 40.0 55.9 48.9 45.2
Thailand 17.9 48.4 44.2 37.3 29.6 21.0 35.9 46.9 40.6 34.0
Vietnam 3.7 31.4 22.4 15.1 6.2 35.3 35.0 28.6 19.3
average 8.8 49.1 32.8 24.0 17.2 10.0 36.4 34.1 27.4 23.8
Angola* 4.9 12.1 10.5 7.2 2.6 11.2 10.7 10.6 9.1
Benin* 6.7 13.6 12.4 10.1 5.9 24.7 15.2 11.9 10.6
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Country ry1990 Hendricks r
15−24
1990 r
25−34
1990 r
35−44
1990 r
y
2000 Schoellman r
15−24
2000 r
25−34
2000 r
35−44
2000
Botswana* 16.3 21.8 13.7 8.5 16.5 42.9 27.8 20.1 12.2
Burkina Faso* 4.0 8.3 7.0 6.0 4.3 11.5 8.8 6.9 5.9
Burundi* 3.1 11.5 10.6 10.0 1.9 15.3 13.0 9.7 9.0
Cameroon 7.1 23.1 20.9 16.0 4.9 26.2 25.1 21.0 18.8
Cape Verde 8.4 19.2 14.4 11.8 8.3 31.1 21.9 17.2 12.6
Central African Republic* 2.8 14.1 13.1 10.6 2.0 13.9 13.5 12.4 11.5
Chad* 2.3 10.7 9.5 8.4 2.1 15.5 11.8 9.0 8.1
Comoros* 5.4 16.0 11.9 8.3 3.5 19.0 14.9 14.4 10.1
Congo* 14.0 34.4 25.9 17.2 8.4 26.2 31.4 32.6 23.8
Djibouti* 12.1 9.8 8.7 7.3 6.8 10.3 9.3 8.4 7.4
Equatorial Guinea* 6.7 16.0 11.7 5.9 25.7 24.3 16.5 14.7 10.6
Eritrea 2.9 6.6 5.1 4.4 2.9 9.4 7.0 6.4 4.3
Ethiopia 2.8 29.8 8.8 7.6 6.0 2.2 13.1 9.3 7.5 6.4
Gabon* 37.4 25.8 24.0 21.7 19.8 34.5 30.4 23.5 21.9
Gambia* 4.4 11.9 9.8 7.8 4.2 22.4 14.4 10.3 8.3
Ghana 6.1 39.5 22.1 19.5 15.1 5.8 26.1 22.6 19.9 17.5
Guinea* 3.1 9.8 9.8 8.5 2.8 16.8 11.1 8.3 8.4
Guinea-Bissau* 4.5 11.6 10.8 8.5 3.2 17.0 12.2 10.1 9.3
Ivory Coast* 7.9 15.1 13.7 11.7 6.3 18.7 15.7 13.3 12.0
Kenya 6.9 58.2 30.9 26.6 17.5 4.9 37.0 33.2 28.8 24.4
Lesotho* 7.1 27.4 22.5 18.4 7.1 29.4 28.7 25.1 20.5
Liberia 7.9 12.6 11.7 10.4 6.0 25.9 14.5 11.0 9.9
Madagascar* 3.9 19.2 18.6 14.4 2.8 17.5 18.9 17.1 16.6
Malawi* 2.5 15.8 13.7 12.0 2.4 24.0 17.4 13.9 11.8
Mali* 4.9 8.4 8.1 6.8 4.7 14.1 9.3 7.1 6.9
Mauritania* 7.4 10.4 9.0 7.6 6.3 19.3 12.1 8.9 7.6
Mauritius* 39.9 33.9 27.8 24.8 45.7 39.0 36.6 31.5 25.6
Mozambique* 6.7 11.4 9.8 8.1 6.2 14.3 11.1 9.9 8.4
Namibia* 28.7 27.1 21.5 16.4 20.5 34.4 31.1 24.8 19.4
Niger* 3.9 8.5 7.4 6.2 2.5 9.7 8.3 7.2 6.2
Nigeria 7.7 34.9 13.6 11.3 7.8 6.1 18.7 14.3 12.1 10.0
Reunion* 25.2 40.2 32.6 25.1 19.3 45.0 45.3 37.8 30.4
Rwanda* 4.2 17.7 18.1 14.5 2.6 30.3 21.2 15.6 16.2
Senegal 7.2 12.0 11.0 9.3 6.1 16.6 13.1 10.3 9.5
Seychelles* 30.5 40.1 34.3 26.0 24.0 43.7 49.6 37.7 32.4
Sierra Leone 6.2 13.0 12.0 9.8 2.3 30.0 15.8 11.4 10.4
Somalia 8.9 9.4 8.8 7.6 4.8 9.0 8.7 8.0 7.3
South Africa 24.3 95.0 28.4 23.1 20.8 19.6 43.8 39.6 25.9 21.3
Sudan 5.5 9.8 7.9 5.7 12.8 15.2 10.6 8.5 6.8
Swaziland* 18.9 28.6 23.6 15.5 15.4 35.9 31.9 26.6 21.6
Tanzania 2.5 15.8 12.7 9.6 2.3 18.5 14.2 14.2 10.9
Togo* 4.4 24.0 18.8 13.7 2.6 25.5 23.1 22.0 16.6
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15−24
1990 r
25−34
1990 r
35−44
1990 r
y
2000 Schoellman r
15−24
2000 r
25−34
2000 r
35−44
2000
Uganda 2.9 13.8 11.5 9.9 3.3 23.7 16.7 11.9 9.9
Zaire* 3.1 21.5 21.7 15.8 1.1 12.6 3.7 12.1 14.3
Zambia* 4.4 22.4 24.4 16.9 2.4 28.4 26.4 20.2 22.4
Zimbabwe 7.5 33.7 23.9 19.1 4.6 34.6 29.4 22.3 18.6
average 9.0 46.4 17.3 14.5 11.1 5.4 20.8 16.5 14.1 12.3
Argentina 35.2 60.6 49.1 37.1 29.8 37.0 62.8 53.3 37.9 35.2
Bahamas 70.3 54.2 42.4 37.7 57.3 41.1 53.0 41.9 39.5
Barbados 34.7 67.9 44.7 34.9 29.2 29.7 63.1 48.3 35.7 33.1
Belize 26.6 50.7 37.6 36.0 34.6 21.8 39.5 39.6 31.9 33.6
Bolivia 13.9 48.3 28.7 21.4 15.8 11.0 43.1 32.4 24.5 19.7
Brazil 26.0 59.1 33.5 25.8 18.4 20.4 41.1 36.5 27.7 23.9
Chile 37.6 67.7 45.7 35.4 29.4 46.6 58.4 51.1 36.2 33.8
Colombia 23.3 48.7 25.5 20.9 16.2 22.5 34.3 29.0 22.8 19.0
Costa Rica 27.4 52.3 34.2 27.5 22.8 26.5 35.8 34.6 28.7 25.6
Cuba 15.8 37.2 26.1 20.4 10.4 48.9 40.0 30.4 23.7
Dominican Republic 13.8 49.8 31.3 25.2 20.1 16.3 38.5 34.8 26.5 23.2
Ecuador 24.1 54.3 38.3 25.6 18.6 17.3 41.4 37.7 30.5 23.7
El Salvador 13.2 44.7 30.0 27.7 25.7 13.9 40.6 34.1 26.3 25.9
Guatemala 21.6 39.8 18.2 15.9 12.8 20.9 27.0 20.6 17.4 14.0
Guyana 9.1 48.2 37.5 37.1 35.1 13.2 38.6 35.7 31.4 34.8
Haiti 5.6 36.4 13.6 12.6 14.1 3.4 18.6 18.2 15.8 10.9
Honduras 13.4 42.4 24.7 19.9 16.5 9.3 27.8 25.3 22.2 18.0
Jamaica 18.1 57.7 40.2 32.6 25.7 15.2 41.8 40.8 32.6 30.6
Mexico 39.0 49.5 33.1 25.9 19.9 33.4 40.3 36.2 27.7 23.9
Nicaragua 10.2 42.0 28.5 23.0 17.6 7.9 30.4 28.6 24.5 20.7
Panama 26.0 59.8 44.0 33.5 30.0 22.6 43.9 44.3 35.4 31.4
Paraguay 17.7 33.2 28.5 28.2 13.6 30.6 31.1 28.7 26.3
Peru 17.6 53.9 36.4 26.1 20.9 15.6 45.4 41.4 30.3 24.3
Puerto Rico 71.6 63.7 53.0 39.3 34.4 74.2 55.6 53.4 40.1 38.1
Suriname* 15.2 31.4 26.1 25.6 11.8 41.9 36.8 27.8 23.8
Trinidad 53.1 42.6 33.9 27.2 47.6 44.6 44.8 34.4 31.9
Uruguay 32.2 72.4 40.6 29.1 23.2 31.9 60.1 47.7 33.0 27.4
Venezuela 51.4 52.6 30.2 24.2 19.5 34.2 40.9 33.5 25.7 22.4
average 28.9 54.8 33.9 26.2 20.1 24.5 42.1 37.0 28.1 24.3
Bahrain* 21.3 39.5 30.9 24.0 20.3 55.8 48.9 32.7 28.9
Iran 30.4 51.8 22.8 18.0 11.7 28.2 34.1 26.8 20.2 16.2
Iraq 26.0 51.9 24.7 21.4 13.5 9.2 31.5 28.4 22.1 19.3
Jordan 54.1 47.1 24.9 20.3 16.7 30.9 31.1 25.4 21.8 18.3
Kuwait 34.8 28.6 27.4 22.0 33.9 26.5 24.4 23.8 25.5
Lebanon 20.1 38.7 28.4 21.9 23.7 49.0 42.9 31.4 26.5
Oman* 37.5 13.7 9.3 6.7 41.6 30.9 22.1 13.7 7.7
Qatar* 28.0 11.9 8.1 4.1 39.1 50.3 13.8 7.9 4.7
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15−24
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25−34
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35−44
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2000 Schoellman r
15−24
2000 r
25−34
2000 r
35−44
2000
Saudi Arabia 57.4 17.4 15.7 11.4 53.8 34.7 24.9 16.8 13.6
Syria 50.5 65.9 33.6 25.7 17.9 42.9 37.9 34.4 26.4 23.4
UAE 52.0 30.2 23.9 16.6 31.4 42.9 36.7 25.7 21.8
Yemen 22.1 15.1 12.1 8.5 21.0 30.2 21.2 14.8 10.3
average 33.5 53.8 24.9 19.8 13.1 30.8 34.6 27.7 20.6 17.0
Algeria 26.9 24.8 17.3 12.8 18.0 46.9 35.3 22.4 15.6
Egypt 18.3 65.5 29.3 19.5 16.3 20.0 46.1 38.9 25.9 17.8
Libya* 24.3 32.0 25.0 17.7 11.9 46.5 36.9 26.6 22.8
Morocco 18.5 15.9 14.0 11.8 15.0 21.1 16.8 15.0 12.2
Tunisia* 24.6 26.5 20.7 17.7 25.4 40.7 32.7 23.3 19.1
average 18.3 65.5 29.3 19.5 16.3 18.5 40.1 32.6 22.6 16.4
overall relative hc average 23.4 62.1 39.6 30.6 22.6 19.7 42.9 38.8 31.5 27.2
Notes: * Not in Schoellman (2012) sample.
Table A3: Relative Output per Worker, Human Capital, and Predicted School Quality Measures
Predicted
Country ry2010 Schoellman r
15−24
2010 r
25−34
2010 r
35−44
2010
Australia 77.3 89.2 81.8 75.6 70.3
Austria 75.8 80.1 78.3 72.6 63.3
Belgium 85.6 79.0 81.5 77.6 71.1
Canada 74.0 94.9 89.3 92.6 86.2
Denmark 72.3 113.4 91.4 83.1 80.6
Finland 75.2 106.4 84.1 80.0 72.7
France 75.2 72.0 76.1 71.4 62.3
Germany 64.7 88.6 82.3 78.5 71.1
Iceland* 63.6 129.6 86.1 78.6 76.9
Ireland 75.4 73.8 79.0 75.0 71.8
Luxembourg* 178.9 53.9 67.7 62.0 59.2
Netherlands 74.0 80.7 84.4 82.9 80.0
New Zealand 58.6 112.0 91.3 80.0 73.8
Norway 83.4 89.9 84.5 79.8 71.6
Sweden 77.9 97.1 82.3 75.5 70.5
Switzerland 72.7 78.1 78.5 74.6 64.0
United Kingdom 76.6 89.4 86.8 76.5 73.5
average 73.2 86.6 82.9 78.2 71.9
Cyprus 56.7 60.1 44.6 34.6 27.7
Greece 51.0 103.5 77.7 69.9 61.5
Israel 78.0 77.6 61.0 42.8 42.4
Italy 72.2 97.7 79.8 69.0 61.6
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Predicted
Country ry2010 Schoellman r
15−24
2010 r
25−34
2010 r
35−44
2010
Malta* 59.8 68.8 62.2 55.8 45.2
Portugal 45.9 75.2 69.9 58.1 48.9
Spain 53.6 82.6 76.7 70.9 65.4
Turkey 37.3 47.6 52.2 43.8 34.0
average 54.3 77.0 69.2 60.3 52.8
Albania* 19.1 50.1 35.6 18.7 16.5
Armenia* 39.2 50.0 40.1 22.6 20.0
Azerbaijan 27.6 55.6 49.9 27.2 24.1
Belarus 46.2 86.2 56.5 32.8 29.0
Bulgaria 31.4 73.9 53.8 37.1 32.8
Czech Republic 42.1 74.6 51.8 35.2 31.2
Estonia* 60.9 88.9 62.1 47.8 42.3
Georgia 21.5 61.2 57.1 37.4 33.1
Hungary 31.3 81.2 51.4 43.2 31.5
Kazakhstan* 34.7 66.7 57.4 35.1 31.1
Kyrgyzstan* 10.4 63.3 49.1 37.0 32.7
Latvia 37.7 87.1 61.2 44.9 39.8
Lithuania 36.1 90.3 61.7 47.5 42.0
Moldova* 14.5 51.8 20.9 30.5 27.0
Poland 36.6 85.1 51.5 44.9 29.8
Romania 15.8 73.7 48.3 31.9 28.2
Russia 26.1 78.9 58.5 58.8 36.9
Slovak Republic 40.0 71.1 46.9 24.4 21.6
Tajikistan* 7.2 52.6 21.4 16.4 29.8
Turkmenistan* 18.2 40.4 53.4 38.2 19.7
Ukraine 15.4 89.4 61.6 36.0 20.4
Uzbekistan 23.2 52.9 50.0 30.2 12.9
Yugoslavia 27.8 45.0 27.9 13.0 11.5
average 26.6 75.3 54.4 44.3 30.0
Hong Kong 94.9 80.9 66.9 60.7 52.5
Japan 74.9 75.9 82.0 79.0 77.3
Singapore 86.5 52.9 65.7 57.3 49.6
South Korea 75.6 106.3 73.5 62.7 52.6
Taiwan 78.0 76.8 68.0 56.6 47.8
average 76.5 82.5 77.5 71.6 66.8
Afghanistan 5.0 32.1 15.1 10.5 8.9
Bangladesh 4.3 23.5 16.8 14.3 12.0
Bhutan* 6.8 23.4 11.7 7.3 4.6
Cambodia 7.3 29.3 22.3 18.1 15.0
China 22.1 50.2 41.6 32.8 24.6
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Country ry2010 Schoellman r
15−24
2010 r
25−34
2010 r
35−44
2010
Fiji 22.1 40.0 40.1 32.3 29.1
India 14.0 30.5 39.1 34.1 27.5
Indonesia 15.9 42.0 47.8 39.3 32.4
Laos 6.0 24.7 20.4 17.0 14.2
Malaysia 39.5 48.4 52.4 46.0 35.0
Mongolia* 3.9 65.2 51.7 38.0 33.5
Myanmar 13.1 25.3 31.2 26.4 21.0
Nepal 3.5 21.4 27.5 24.9 18.4
North Korea* 3.2 26.6 43.1 42.8 40.8
Pakistan 11.1 18.7 13.0 11.3 9.1
Papua New Guinea* 6.4 13.4 13.6 14.7 15.0
Philippines 12.1 48.4 63.5 59.6 55.2
Sri Lanka 21.4 44.8 58.9 52.4 45.4
Thailand 25.5 48.7 52.7 43.1 37.3
Vietnam 8.9 32.7 41.0 31.5 26.1
average 17.3 40.4 39.6 32.7 25.9
Angola* 7.1 14.4 10.7 9.3 9.4
Benin* 6.0 27.8 20.3 13.2 10.5
Botswana* 15.1 41.8 34.5 25.8 18.4
Burkina Faso* 4.2 17.6 9.8 7.4 5.8
Burundi* 1.6 22.2 13.9 11.4 8.1
Cameroon 4.8 28.6 25.7 22.8 19.1
Cape Verde 8.9 33.1 26.5 19.8 15.5
Central African Republic* 2.0 15.8 12.9 11.8 10.9
Chad* 3.2 18.1 12.7 10.3 7.7
Comoros* 3.6 29.8 18.7 13.1 12.9
Congo* 9.0 29.3 29.1 29.3 30.9
Djibouti* 6.5 14.7 9.7 7.9 7.2
Equitorial Guinea* 62.5 23.0 19.6 14.7 13.4
Eritrea 2.2 13.1 7.9 6.8 5.4
Ethiopia 3.2 24.4 12.0 7.9 6.4
Gabon* 16.5 33.6 32.5 27.8 21.3
Gambia* 4.2 26.2 17.7 12.7 8.9
Ghana 7.5 33.6 26.4 20.5 18.1
Guinea* 2.6 25.3 14.6 9.3 7.1
Guinea-Bissau* 2.7 24.1 15.2 10.5 8.8
Ivory Coast* 5.6 18.9 16.2 13.8 11.7
Kenya 5.0 42.9 38.4 30.7 26.9
Lesotho* 7.2 30.5 29.1 26.4 23.1
Liberia 4.1 25.1 19.5 12.5 9.6
Madagascar* 2.2 20.8 17.9 16.9 15.3
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Country ry2010 Schoellman r
15−24
2010 r
25−34
2010 r
35−44
2010
Malawi* 2.5 31.9 21.9 15.4 12.2
Mali* 4.9 23.2 12.2 7.8 5.9
Mauritania* 5.8 22.4 15.0 10.4 7.6
Mauritius* 52.7 52.3 40.7 34.1 29.2
Mozambique* 9.0 18.5 12.5 9.5 8.7
Namibia* 18.3 38.8 33.6 28.8 22.8
Niger* 2.5 13.0 8.6 7.0 6.0
Nigeria 10.0 23.9 16.7 12.6 10.7
Reunion* 15.9 42.2 45.8 43.0 35.5
Rwanda* 3.6 33.8 27.0 18.8 13.8
Senegal 5.8 21.9 14.7 11.4 8.9
Seychelles* 20.6 44.7 46.2 47.7 35.4
Sierra Leone 3.0 32.1 23.2 13.8 9.9
Somalia 5.1 9.7 8.1 7.3 6.8
South Africa 22.5 49.0 40.4 31.4 23.4
Sudan 15.8 19.7 12.4 9.2 7.3
Swaziland* 14.8 33.9 33.9 29.6 24.7
Tanzania 2.6 23.4 17.2 12.4 12.7
Togo* 2.1 29.1 25.2 21.0 20.2
Uganda 4.6 28.5 19.8 14.8 10.3
Zaire* 1.1 22.9 3.1 2.1 7.8
Zambia* 3.2 33.0 28.7 24.1 18.2
Zimbabwe 2.4 32.8 25.1 19.3 17.1
average 6.6 26.3 18.1 13.9 12.0
Argentina 37.6 76.1 56.3 39.5 36.4
Bahamas 40.5 51.4 47.2 40.1 40.2
Barbados 35.6 65.8 55.2 37.1 33.8
Belize 17.4 42.4 42.5 33.2 29.6
Bolivia 11.8 60.2 39.2 27.2 22.7
Brazil 21.6 53.1 40.4 29.7 25.9
Chile 45.1 71.3 53.5 38.4 34.4
Colombia 24.1 46.2 34.4 24.8 20.8
Costa Rica 27.2 43.8 38.3 28.9 26.8
Cuba 13.6 60.7 44.7 31.8 28.6
Dominican Republic 19.8 48.1 38.6 28.8 24.6
Ecuador 18.0 46.7 41.2 30.3 29.0
El Salvador 11.6 52.8 40.4 29.4 24.1
Guatemala 18.9 35.2 25.7 18.9 15.4
Guyana 13.9 49.1 42.7 31.3 29.3
Haiti 2.7 29.8 19.1 17.3 13.8
Honduras 10.1 34.3 28.2 22.2 20.2
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Predicted
Country ry2010 Schoellman r
15−24
2010 r
25−34
2010 r
35−44
2010
Jamaica 13.3 49.7 43.7 33.1 30.7
Mexico 29.2 50.4 40.0 29.7 25.8
Nicaragua 6.9 35.0 30.9 24.6 22.7
Panama 25.1 51.9 45.6 35.3 33.5
Paraguay 12.3 41.2 34.9 27.1 26.5
Peru 18.7 50.6 43.2 32.5 28.3
Puerto Rico 62.7 89.9 54.2 40.1 38.7
Suriname* 26.0 39.6 39.4 30.7 25.4
Trinidad 61.6 47.2 45.8 35.3 32.5
Uruguay 38.1 75.1 51.5 35.8 31.1
Venezuela 35.7 66.1 39.3 28.3 23.8
average 24.6 53.7 40.7 29.9 26.2
Bahrain* 13.8 56.7 50.0 36.5 30.6
Iran 31.5 48.4 32.7 22.9 18.5
Iraq 11.4 32.8 29.9 24.0 20.1
Jordan 34.8 53.1 32.2 22.6 20.0
Kuwait 52.2 41.4 31.3 22.6 22.2
Lebanon 21.7 58.7 45.9 33.5 29.6
Oman* 38.3 38.6 24.8 18.5 11.9
Qatar* 26.4 47.4 13.8 9.1 4.7
Saudi Arabia 46.9 54.5 31.0 21.7 14.9
Syria 48.9 42.1 37.8 28.1 24.8
UAE 36.9 52.8 40.1 29.6 23.8
Yemen 18.4 35.1 25.1 18.6 13.0
average 32.1 46.2 32.3 23.4 18.6
Algeria 18.2 53.8 38.8 27.8 20.3
Egypt 20.2 48.9 40.3 30.2 23.7
Libya* 13.5 70.2 42.3 30.0 24.9
Morocco 18.8 29.8 20.4 16.0 13.4
Tunisia* 29.1 63.2 37.6 27.4 21.4
average 19.8 47.9 35.9 26.7 20.8
overall relative hc average 24.1 47.7 42.7 35.6 29.2
Notes: * Not in Schoellman (2012) sample.
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